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IS IT REALLY ALL ABOUT RACE?:  
SECTION 1985(3) POLITICAL CONSPIRACIES 
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND BEYOND 
Lee Pinzow* 
 
The recent scandal involving the Internal Revenue Service’s targeting of 
conservative Tea Party groups highlights the need for a judicial remedy to 
politically motivated deprivations of legally recognized rights.  Section 2 of 
the Ku Klux Klan Act, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), presents such a 
remedy. 
However, it is unclear whether the statute applies to conspiracies 
motivated solely by political animus.  The U.S. Supreme Court in Griffin v. 
Breckenridge and United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 610 v. Scott 
delved into the question but chose not to resolve the issue.  Based on the 
Court’s discussion of the statute’s legislative history in Griffin and Scott, 
eight of the eleven federal circuit courts to address the issue now require 
racial animus to motivate conspiracies against politically defined classes.  
Two circuits maintain their pre-Scott application of § 1985(3) conspiracies 
motivated by political party affiliation.  After Scott, the Second Circuit 
applies the racial animus requirement to politically motivated conspiracies 
against members of classes defined by common actions or commonly held 
beliefs, but it has yet to decide whether its pre-Scott application of 
§ 1985(3) to political affiliation motivated conspiracies remains valid.  The 
district courts within the Second Circuit have articulated different 
approaches to applying Second Circuit precedent to political affiliation 
animus cases. 
This Note describes the holdings of the Second Circuit in the context of 
the greater circuit split and examines the approaches taken by the district 
courts within the Second Circuit.  This Note concludes that the Second 
Circuit could resolve the confusion among its district courts by extending 
§ 1985(3) to conspiracies motivated solely by political party affiliation but 
by requiring racial animus for all other politically motivated conspiracies.  
This would remain consistent with the legislative history, historical context, 
and Supreme Court interpretation of the Ku Klux Klan Act. 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2015, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Pace University.  I 
would like to thank Professor Robin Lenhardt for her counsel and advice with this Note.  I 
also would like to thank all those friends who encouraged me to continue researching and 
writing at moments I contemplated not completing this project. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In May 2013, allegations arose that, in the lead up to the 2010 
congressional elections, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) targeted Tea 
Party–affiliated groups seeking tax-free status for politically motivated 
selective review.1  The IRS allegedly sought the donor lists, volunteer lists, 
and party affiliations of these conservative organizations‘ officers and 
directors.2  IRS officials also inquired about any times that these officers 
and directors had previously run for office and about any future political 
ambitions these individuals might have.3  An avalanche of news stories 
appeared after the Associated Press brought to light a Treasury Department 
Inspector General draft report that found Tea Party–affiliated groups were 
placed under undue scrutiny by IRS junior staff members.4  Republican 
legislators and conservative pundits accused the White House of attempting 
to cover up the scandal.5  Some IRS employees believed that President 
Obama wanted to ―crack down‖ on conservative organizations seeking not-
for-profit status.6  This may have been because ―in every meaningful sense 
[these groups] were operating as units of the Republican Party‖ and were 
instrumental in the Republican‘s retention of control of the House of 
Representatives.7 
Forty-one Tea Party groups brought suit against the United States, the 
IRS, IRS officials, and U.S. Treasury Department officials.8  The Tea Party 
groups allege constitutional violations, violations of the Administrative 
Procedure Act,9 and violations of the Internal Revenue Code.10  However, 
the Tea Party groups have chosen not to avail themselves of a potential civil 
rights statutory remedy. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, The IRS Scandal:  Tempest and the Tea Party, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 16, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/ 
116958-the-irs-scandal-tempest-and-the-tea-party. 
 2. See Complaint at 20, Linchpins of Liberty et al. v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-00777-
RBW (D.D.C. June 25, 2013) [hereinafter Linchpins Complaint], available at 
http://media.aclj.org/pdf/tea-party-complaint-amended.pdf. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Real I.R.S. Scandal, NEW YORKER DAILY COMMENT BLOG 
(May 14, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/05/irs-scandal-tea-
party-oversight.html; see also The IRS Targeting Controversy:  A Timeline, CBS NEWS (May 
24, 2013, 12:02 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-irs-targeting-controversy-a-
timeline/. 
 5. See Barrett, supra note 1. 
 6. See Stephen Dinan, IRS Officials Thought Obama Wanted Crackdown on Tea Party 
Groups, Worried About Negative Press, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2013,  
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/17/report-irs-staff-acutely-aware-tea-party-
antipathy/?page=all.  Judicial Watch, a government watchdog group, went so far as to allege 
that ―[t]he Obama IRS suppressed the entire tea party movement just in time to help Obama 
win reelection.‖ See Cheryl K. Chumley, Judicial Watch Sues IRS for Stonewalling on Tea 
Party FOIA, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 
2013/oct/15/judicial-watch-sues-irs-stonewalling-tea-party-foi/. 
 7. See Toobin, supra note 4. 
 8. See Linchpins Complaint, supra note 2, at 1–6. 
 9. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2012). 
 10. Linchpins Complaint, supra note 2, at 27–40. 
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42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)11 provides a federal cause of action to a person 
injured by an act in furtherance of a conspiracy to deprive that person of his 
or her civil rights against any member of said conspiracy.  Section 1985(3) 
provides this remedy to victims who are members of an identifiable class of 
persons targeted because of ―racial, or perhaps [some other] class-based, 
invidiously discriminatory animus.‖12  The statute could provide an avenue 
of relief to Tea Party members if a conspiracy motivated by animus against 
the Tea Party, ostensibly part of the Republican Party,13 is within the 
intended reach of the statute. 
Section 1985(3) originated as section 2 of ―[a]n act to enforce the 
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, and for other Purposes‖—commonly known today as the Ku Klux 
Klan Act or the Civil Rights Act of 1871.14  Congress passed the Act in 
response to escalating violence in the Reconstruction South that was 
perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan and similar groups against blacks and 
Republicans.15  The Act created two ways for the federal government to 
combat Klan violence in the South.16  First, the measure created a role for 
the federal courts in deterring civil rights violations by imposing federal 
civil and criminal penalties for such violations.17  Second, the measure 
provided the president with the authority to declare martial law or suspend 
habeas corpus to quell violence that interfered with the ―execution of justice 
or federal law.‖18 
The Supreme Court‘s refusal to declare whether § 1985(3) requires 
victims of conspiracies that target members of political organizations to 
allege racial animus as a motivating factor, and dicta indicating that such a 
requirement may exist, led to a circuit split on the issue.19  The circuits 
 
 11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012) (―If two or more persons in any State or Territory 
conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of 
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the 
laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or 
Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal 
protection of the laws . . . [and] if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be 
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in 
his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a 
citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the 
recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of 
the conspirators.‖). 
 12. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). 
 13. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 14. Kenneth A. K. Martin, Note, The Sixth Circuit Takes a Stand:  Conklin v. Lovely 
and the Extension of Protection Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) to Victims of Non-Racial, 
Politically Discriminatory Conspiracies, 20 U. TOL. L. REV. 733, 735 (1989). 
 15. Id. at 735–36 & n.12. 
 16. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  CIVIL RIGHTS 591 (Bernard 
Schwartz ed., 1970).  See generally Act of Apr. 20, 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871), ch. 
22, 17 Stat. 13. 
 17. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 
591. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See infra Part I.C. 
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continue to struggle to define actionable nonracial class-based animus.20  
The Second Circuit once rejected the racial animus requirement,21 but 
called its previous decision into question in response to the Supreme Court 
dicta.22  The Second Circuit elected not to resolve the issue.23  The failure 
of both the Supreme Court and Second Circuit to decide whether the racial 
animus must motivate conspiracies against members of political parties led 
to divergent applications among the district courts within the Second 
Circuit.24 
As a result, the viability of a potential § 1985(3) claim by members of 
Tea Party groups in the Second Circuit may depend on the county in which 
the action is brought.  It appears that a Tea Party group bringing an action 
in Brooklyn may state a § 1985(3) claim related to IRS targeting, but a 
group bringing an action in Manhattan may not.25 
This Note examines the issues raised by the Court‘s holding in Griffin v. 
Breckenridge26 and dicta in United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 610 v. 
Scott,27 regarding a potential racial animus requirement for purely political 
§ 1985(3) conspiracy claims.  In doing so, this Note identifies the circuit 
court split over the racial animus requirement and closely examines the 
disparate positions taken by the district courts of the Second Circuit.  Part I 
discusses the historical background of the Ku Klux Klan Act, including the 
social and political atmosphere of the Reconstruction South, the 
motivations behind Klan violence, and the purpose for the Act derived from 
the debates of the 42nd Congress.  Part I also summarizes the Supreme 
Court‘s treatment of the Act from its enactment to Bray v. Alexandria 
Women’s Health Clinic28 and describes a long-lasting circuit split over 
whether injuries caused by conspiracies targeting people based on their 
political affiliation are actionable under § 1985(3).  Part II describes the 
different approaches taken by the district courts within the Second Circuit 
in their attempts to reconcile the Second Circuit‘s holdings in Keating v. 
Carey29 and Gleason v. McBride.30  Part III suggests that the Second 
Circuit should accept targeting based on membership in a political party as 
sufficient to establish class-based animus.  Part III, furthermore, 
recommends that the Second Circuit distinguish between political party 
affiliation, and collective action or shared beliefs.  By drawing this 
distinction and holding the latter insufficient to define class-based animus 
required by Griffin and Scott, the proposed position would keep the Second 
 
 20. See infra Part I.C. 
 21. See infra Part II.A. 
 22. See infra Part II.B. 
 23. See infra Part II.B. 
 24. See infra Part II.C. 
 25. See infra Parts I.C.1, II.C.1–2. 
 26. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). 
 27. 463 U.S. 825 (1983). 
 28. 506 U.S. 263 (1993). 
 29. 706 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 30. 869 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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Circuit in compliance with both Scott and Bray, while reconciling Keating 
with Gleason. 
I.   HISTORICAL PURPOSE AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
OF THE KU KLUX KLAN ACT 
After close to a century of near dormancy, a resurgence of section 2 of 
the Ku Klux Klan Act—presently codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)—and the 
Supreme Court‘s opinions interpreting the statute‘s legislative history, have 
led federal courts to disagree over whether Congress intended the Act to 
remedy purely political conspiracies.  Part I.A illustrates the social and 
political landscape that the 42nd Congress faced when debating the Ku 
Klux Klan Act.  Part I.A also explores the rich legislative history of the Act 
to elucidate what motivated Congress to act.  Part I.B tracks the evolution 
of the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of the statute and its legislative 
history.  Part I.C outlines the federal circuit court split over whether 
§ 1985(3) provides a remedy to injuries caused by political conspiracies not 
motivated by racial animus. 
A.   The Historical Background of the Ku Klux Klan Act 
The Civil War and Reconstruction drastically changed ―the economic and 
political map of the white South.‖31  Before the end of the war, the white 
plantation elite lost economic and political power as a result of the Union 
administration of abandoned or confiscated plantations,32 execution of 
President Abraham Lincoln‘s plan to quickly restore former rebellious 
states into the Union,33 and the loss of economic independence of yeoman 
farmers.34  The planter class was also ―devastated‖ by battle casualties, loss 
 
 31. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:  AMERICA‘S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–
1877, at 17 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., Perennial 2002). 
 32. See id. at 55.  Starting in late 1862, abandoned cotton plantations in Louisiana were 
leased to Northern investors to be put back into operation. Id.  Former slaves worked on 
these plantations for wages, in a ―transition from slave to free labor.‖ Id.  In the spring of 
1863, General Lorenzo Thomas planned to lease plantations along the Mississippi River to 
Northerners and those Southern planters who ―renounced their allegiance to the 
Confederacy,‖ on the condition that both groups hire blacks to work under terms set by the 
Army. Id. at 57.  On January 16, 1865, General William T. Sherman issued Special Field 
Order No. 15, which set aside the Sea Island and a portion of the Charleston coast for the 
settlement of blacks. See id. at 70.  Each family would be granted forty acres of land and 
loaned an army mule, to relieve the pressure the increasing mass of freed slaves placed on 
army supplies and movement. See id. at 70–71. 
 33. See id. at 35, 37.  On December 8, 1863, President Lincoln issued a Proclamation of 
Amnesty and Reconstruction, offering a pardon and restoration of all rights, except for slave 
ownership, to anyone who pledged future loyalty to the Union and acceptance of abolition. 
See id.  A state could establish a new state government and regain representation in Congress 
when the number of persons making the pledge reached 10 percent of the votes cast in the 
1860 presidential election for that state, so long as the new government drafted a new 
constitution abolishing slavery. Id. at 35–36.  For example, Louisiana‘s first Reconstruction 
constitution ―ratified the overthrow of Louisiana‘s old order.‖ Id. at 49.  Delegates included 
professionals, ―small businessmen, artisans, and civil servants,‖ reflecting the urban 
orientation of the unionist coalition and a departure from the traditional control of 
slaveholders. Id. 
 34. Id. at 17. 
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of life savings in Confederate bonds, and the loss of both unpaid labor and 
family net worth from emancipation.35 
With the end of the war, President Andrew Johnson continued a program 
of presidentially directed reconstruction.36  By 1866, congressional 
Republicans attempted to adjust presidential Reconstruction with the 
passage of a Freedman‘s Bureau bill and a civil rights bill, because they 
believed that President Johnson‘s program of restoration of Southern states 
did not sufficiently ensure the loyalty of Southern officeholders.37  
President Johnson‘s vetoes of both bills, and Congress‘s successful override 
of the Civil Rights bill, galvanized radical and moderate Republicans in the 
belief that they could no longer work with the President.38  The Republican 
Congress wrested control of Reconstruction policy from President Johnson 
with its override of the President‘s veto of the Reconstruction Act of 
1867.39 
Between 1867 and 1869, Southern states engaged in a round of 
constitutional conventions to draw up new state constitutions in compliance 
with requirements for readmission into the Union.40  These conventions 
consisted largely of blacks, Northern Republicans (carpetbaggers) and 
Southern Unionists (scalawags).41  Most antebellum officials were barred 
from participating and many opponents of Reconstruction who remained 
eligible to participate abstained from voting for delegates.42  As a result, the 
 
 35. See id. at 129. 
 36. See id. at 181–83.  Initially, President Johnson indicated he would recognize the new 
Southern state governments created under Lincoln‘s Amnesty Proclamation—governments 
that did not grant black suffrage. Id. at 182.  The President also granted amnesty to all 
participants in the rebellion who swore an oath of loyalty to the Union unless they were 
high-level Confederate officials, owners of more than $20,000 in taxable property, or 
another member of thirteen classes of Confederates. Id. at 183.  Individuals not granted 
general amnesty could gain amnesty upon individual application to the President. Id. 
 37. See id. at 240–42, 246.  The Freedman‘s Bureau bill extended the life of the 
Freedman‘s Bureau in the South and provided the federal justice system with the authority to 
punish state officials who denied blacks the ―civil rights belonging to white persons.‖ Id. at 
243 (quoting Letter from Lyman Trumbull to Dr. William Jayne (Dec. 24, 1865), in DR. 
WILLIAM JAYNE PAPERS (on file with Illinois State Historical Society)).  The civil rights bill 
granted national citizenship to all people, except Native Americans, born in the United 
States, and listed certain rights that could not be deprived on the basis of race. Id. 
 38. See id. at 250–51. 
 39. See id. at 267, 271.  In December of 1866, months before the passage, veto, and veto 
override of the Reconstruction Act of 1867, Senator James Grimes described Congress‘s 
mood about the upcoming legislative session when he said:  ―The President has no power to 
control or influence anybody and legislation will be carried on entirely regardless of his 
opinions or wishes.‖ Id. at 271.  The Act divided the South into five military districts to 
ensure internal security and laid out steps for Southern states‘ readmission into the Union, 
including writing new state constitutions and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
at 267. An amendment to the Act clarified that anyone holding an office before the war that 
required swearing an oath to the U.S. Constitution could not vote to support these new 
constitutions. See Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2. 
 40. See FONER, supra note 31, at 316–17. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id.; Lou Falkner Williams, The Constitution and the Ku Klux Klan on Trial:  
Federal Enforcement and Local Resistance in South Carolina, 1871–1872, 2 GA. J. S. LEGAL 
HIST. 41, 43 (1993). 
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former white political elite did not recognize the legitimacy of the resulting 
governments.43  A common belief within this group was that the resulting 
state governments were incapable of representing Southern gentlemen 
because of their composition.44  Southern whites were also infuriated by 
Republican reliance on property taxes to fund public schools, hospitals, 
mental health facilities, and other internal improvements.45  Despite the 
failure of property taxes as a method of land redistribution,46 large Southern 
landowners perceived the tax program as a method to force owners to sell 
unused land, often in small parcels, and to collect land forfeited after tax 
defaults to distribute to freedmen.47  Resentment over newly imposed high 
taxes ―undermined the authority of the Republican government, as surely 
as . . . racism.‖48 
In 1868, violence, long a tool in enforcing social mores,49 entered the 
electoral process.50  The Ku Klux Klan launched a ―reign of terror‖ on 
white and black Republican leaders and black voters, to prevent the election 
of the Republican slate of federal and state officials.51  White gangs also 
attacked Republican political meetings and destroyed local Republican 
newspapers.52  It is clear from the 1868 election results that the aim of this 
violence was the defeat of Republican candidates from the president down 
to the local level.53 
The Klan expanded its use of violence in nearly every Southern state in 
response to the imposition of congressional Reconstruction and the election 
of Republicans in 1868.54  The Klan acted as a counterrevolutionary 
 
 43. See FONER, supra note 31, at 346; Williams, supra note 42, at 44–45.  Men who held 
a position requiring an oath of office to the U.S. Constitution before the Civil War were 
denied voting rights if they supported the Confederacy during the war. See Act of Mar. 23, 
1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2; FONER, supra note 31, at 275; Williams, supra note 42, at 43. 
 44. See Williams, supra note 42, at 45 (quoting Benjamin F. Perry, Speech at Anderson 
Court House 10–11 (March 1868), in Benjamin F. Perry Papers, microformed on S. 
Historical Collection of the Univ. of N.C. Library (Photographic Serv., Univ. of N.C. 
Library)).  The white political elite confronted new governments controlled by three 
disfavored groups:  blacks, believed not to be entitled to a role in governance; carpetbaggers, 
or Northerners generally hated by Southerners; and scalawags, considered traitors or lepers 
among Southerners loyal to the Confederacy. See FONER, supra note 31, at 297, 346–47. 
 45. See Williams, supra note 42, at 46. 
 46. See FONER, supra note 31, at 376. 
 47. See Williams, supra note 42, at 46. 
 48. Id. at 47. 
 49. See FONER, supra note 31, at 17, 119–21, 425.  From the beginning of the Civil War, 
Unionists in the South were persecuted. See id. at 17.  ―They were driven from their 
homes . . . persecuted like wild beasts by the rebel authorities, and hunted down in the 
mountains; they were hanged on the gallows, shot down and robbed.‖ Id. (quoting CARL 
MONEYHON, REPUBLICANISM IN RECONSTRUCTION TEXAS 18 (1980)).  At the end of the war, 
this expanded to include violence against Blacks, motivated by a determination to stop 
Blacks from establishing autonomy from their former owners. See id. at 119–21. 
 50. See id. at 342. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. at 343.  Democratic candidate for president Horatio Seymour won Georgia 
and Louisiana, two states where Klan violence decimated the Republican Party organization. 
Id.  Even in states where Grant won, the Republican vote fell sharply. Id. 
 54. See id. at 425. 
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military force ―serving the interests of the Democratic Party, the planter 
class,‖ and those who supported a return to white supremacy.55  The Klan 
sought to reverse the sweeping political and economic changes resulting 
from the Civil War and Reconstruction by destroying Republican 
infrastructure, undermining what the majority of white Southerners deemed 
as illegitimate Reconstructionist state governments, reasserting control over 
blacks as a source of labor, and restoring the social subordination of 
blacks.56  Klan members attacked blacks to force them to renounce their 
allegiance to the Republican Party and drive them from other employment 
back to the plantations.57  They also attacked whites and their property for 
voting the Republican ticket or helping to educate blacks.58  The Klan 
murdered both black and white Republican leaders and elected officials.59  
One Democrat in the 42nd Congress rationalized the violence as a result of 
the stripping of political power and control of Southern governments from 
―the wise, virtuous, influential men of the South [to give] to adventurers 
and negroes.‖60  It became clear to Republicans in the North that the Ku 
Klux Klan and like groups were engaged in a campaign of intimidation, 
terror, and violence directed at blacks and white Republicans throughout the 
South ―in an attempt to overthrow the Reconstruction policy of the 
Republican Congress.‖61 
The legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act indicates that the 
President and Congress intended to address violence that was motivated by 
racial animus or the restoration of political control of local and state 
governments. 
On March 28, 1871, President Ulysses S. Grant sent a special message to 
Congress that urged legislation to address an intensifying level of political 
and racial violence in the South, which was perpetrated by the Ku Klux 
Klan and other similar groups.62 
Congress was also independently concerned about the targeted violence 
in the South.  On March 10, 1871, a select committee of the Senate issued a 
 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id.; see also Janet A. Barbiere, Note, Conspiracies to Obstruct Justice in the 
Federal Courts:  Defining the Scope of Section 1985(2), 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1210, 1224–
25, 1227 (1982). 
 57. See Williams, supra note 42, at 52. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See FONER, supra note 31, at 426–28. 
 60. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 386 (1871) (statement of Rep. Joseph 
Lewis); Mark Fockele, Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its Original 
Purpose, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 402, 408 n.31 (1979). 
 61. Joseph A. Culig, Note, Farber v. City of Paterson:  The Third Circuit Weighs In on 
the Future of Protecting Political Classes Under Section 1985(3), 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 1053, 
1056 (2008) (quoting Ken Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution:  A Modern 
Vision of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 64 TEX. L. REV. 527, 534 (1985)); see also Barbiere, 
supra note 56, at 1225; Fockele, supra note 60, at 404–05 (concluding that Congress passed 
the Ku Klux Klan Act to address the violence and ―acts of terror,‖ motivated by Southern 
resistance to political equality). 
 62. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (1871); see 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES:  CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 591; Barbiere, supra note 56, at 1225; 
Martin, supra note 14, at 735. 
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report on the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, using North Carolina as a case 
study.63  The report emphasized that the Klan acted with the political 
purpose to oppose the policies of Reconstruction, including black 
enfranchisement.64  Both the Senate‘s instruction to its Judiciary Committee 
and the Select Committee report‘s conclusions expressed a desire to stop 
violence not only against blacks but against Republicans, Northern 
businessmen, and Unionist Southerners.65  Additionally, the House directed 
a joint committee, established to investigate violence in the South, to 
ascertain whether organized bands of a ―political character‖ were 
responsible for the reported violence, and whether people and property in 
the South were secure.66 
Two weeks after the Senate report, Representative Samuel Shellabarger 
introduced H.R. 320, intended to secure and expand the protections of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 to all people deprived of rights derived from 
national citizenship.67  Section 2 of the original bill established criminal 
penalties for a list of acts contemplated or completed for the purpose of 
either depriving another of their rights or preventing state governments 
from enforcing their laws.68  The House debates over the bill between 
March 28 and April 6, 1871 covered both the concerns that motivated the 
eventual passage of the Act and the concerns over the breadth of its 
language.69  The record in the House contains many statements from the 
floor indicating that Klan violence targeted Republicans.70 
Much of Representative William Stoughton‘s testimony referenced the 
March 10 Senate report on violence in North Carolina in support of his 
argument that Klan violence was politically motivated.71  Stoughton argued 
 
 63. See S. REP. NO. 42-1, at I–II (1871); see also Neil H. Cogan, Section 1985(3)’s 
Restructuring of Equality:  An Essay on Texts, History, Progress, and Cynicism, 39 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 515, 555–56 (1987). 
 64. See Cogan, supra note 63, at 556. 
 65. See id. at 566. 
 66. Fockele, supra note 60, at 408 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 42-1, at ii (1871)). 
 67. See Cogan, supra note 63, at 556 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 
68 (1871)). 
 68. See Ken Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution:  A Modern Vision of 
42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 64 TEX. L. REV. 527, 537 n.17 (1985) (―That if two or more 
persons shall . . . conspire . . . to do any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or 
immunities of another person, which . . . would, under any law of the United States then in 
force, constitute the crime of either murder, manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault and 
battery, perjury, subornation of perjury, criminal obstruction of legal process or resistance of 
officers in discharge of official duty, arson, or larceny; and if one or more of the parties to 
said conspiracy . . . shall do any act to effect the object thereof, all the parties to . . . said 
conspiracy or combination . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and . . . shall be 
punishable as such in the courts of the United States.‖ (quoting the original text of section 2 
of H.R. 320 from CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68–69 (1871))); see also Barbiere, 
supra note 56, at 1228. 
 69. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 
597–620. 
 70. See infra notes 73–79 and accompanying text. 
 71. See Michael Scott Russell, Note, The Ku Klux Klan Act and the Proper Perspective 
on the Scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 2 REGENT U. L. REV. 73, 77 (1992).  Representative 
William Stoughton was a Republican from Michigan in the 42nd Congress who spent a 
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that the Klan served a political purpose and was comprised of members of 
the Democratic—or Conservative—party who sought to use violence 
against their opponents while successfully being protected from conviction 
by the use of disguises, secrecy, and perjury in local courts.72  
Representative Stoughton also noted that the efforts to ―murder . . . leading 
Republicans‖ and terrorize the black population to control the result of 
elections were celebrated as victories for the Democratic Party.73  
Lamenting the success of the Klan‘s tactics, Representative Stoughton 
rhetorically asked how long it would be before the ―Tammany Hall 
Democracy‖—the New York City Democratic organization—adopted 
similar tactics to influence politics in the North.74 
Representative George McKee (a Republican from Mississippi) was 
adamant about the Klan‘s designs against Republicans.75  He warned about 
the potential for Klan practices—murdering opponents and perjuring to 
escape justice—to spread into the North as the Klan increased its influence 
over the Democratic Party.76  He then described the differences between 
Democratic and Republican descriptions of a killing at Meridian, 
Mississippi, where—despite the differences in number—all the casualties 
were Republicans.77  As in similar incidents, initial reports that black 
rioting caused the violence gave way to final reports that only blacks and 
Republicans were killed.78  The targeting of Republicans for Democratic 
gain was a common concern among many House Republicans.79 
The House also considered testimony and floor speeches about both the 
Klan‘s use of violence and threats to achieve political ends, and the 
strategies of Klan members to subvert the judicial system and avoid 
prosecution.  Representative Stoughton detailed testimony that established a 
link between Democratic political figures, Klan membership, and acts of 
 
significant amount of time speaking on Congress‘s justification for H.R. 320. See 1 
STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 599–608. 
 72. See Russell, supra note 71, at 77. 
 73. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 
604 (statement of Rep. Stoughton). 
 74. See id. at 605. 
 75. See id. (statement of Rep. McKee). 
 76. See id. at 611. 
 77. See id. at 612. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See, e.g., Steven F. Shatz, The Second Death of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3):  The Use 
and Misuse of History in Statutory Interpretation, 27 B.C. L. REV. 911, 930 (1986) (―It is 
evident that the lawlessness of the South, at first undirected save by its hates, is now become 
organized in the service of a political party to crush its opponents, and to drive from their 
borders every friend of a Republican Administration . . . . If it was not political in the 
beginning, yet as the objects of its fury, as to persons, were negroes and northern men who 
had gone South . . . it has necessarily become a political engine in the hands of the 
Democracy.‖ (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 443 (1871) (statement of Rep. 
Benjamin Butler))); id. at 930–31 (The acts of violence are ―crimes perpetrated by concert 
and agreement . . . acting with a common purpose for the injury of a certain class of citizens 
entertaining certain political principles . . . . We find that this society is political in its 
nature . . . and is utterly hostile to the Republican party . . . and that its victims are members 
of that party‖ (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 457 (1871) (statement of Rep. 
John Coburn))); see also Fockele, supra note 60, at 408–09 n.32. 
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violence perpetrated to disrupt emerging political processes without fear of 
legal consequence.80  When asked about the ―object‖ of the Klan, a former 
Democratic state legislative candidate and Klan initiate testified that ―[t]heir 
object was the overthrow of the reconstructionist policy of Congress and the 
disenfranchisement of the negro.‖81  Another witness testified that members 
of the Democratic Party invariably supported the Klan, with those 
denouncing the Klan being the exception.82 
Representative Stoughton also recounted testimony from blacks who 
were visited by members of the Klan.83  One witness testified that Klan 
members intimidated blacks to prevent them from voting for Republican 
candidates.84  In the witness‘s experience, however, Klan members did not 
block blacks from voting if they were convinced to vote for Democrats.85 
The House debate included numerous examples of statements indicating 
that membership in political parties or other nonracial groups were 
protected by the Act.86  Supporters of the bill viewed the Klan as a political 
organization that used threats and violence to obtain and maintain 
Democratic control over Southern state and local governments.87  They saw 
 
 80. See Russell, supra note 71, at 77–79.  Acts of intimidation and compliance with the 
terms of Klan membership effectively annulled penal laws and allowed perpetrators to go 
unpunished by limiting the power to arrest transgressors, engaging in the intimidation of 
witnesses, and engendering an unwillingness of white juries to convict whites accused of 
targeted violence or acts that obstructed prosecutions. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 456–57 (1871); see also 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  CIVIL RIGHTS, 
supra note 16, at 601, 603, 618; Barbiere, supra note 56, at 1225; Stephanie M. Wildman, 42 
U.S.C. § 1985(3)—A Private Action to Vindicate Fourteenth Amendment Rights:  A Paradox 
Resolved, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 317, 322 (1980). 
 81. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 
601. 
 82. See id. at 601–02 (comments by Rep. Stoughton reading testimony given by Judge 
Thomas Settle). 
 83. See id. at 603–04 (comments by Rep. Stoughton, recounting testimony given by 
Caswell Holt, ―a poor and ignorant, but honest and conscientious negro who was twice 
visited by the Ku Klux‖). 
 84. See id. at 604; see also Fockele, supra note 60, at 410. 
 85. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 
604 (comments by Rep. Stoughton, presenting testimony given by Caswell Holt); see also 
Fockele, supra note 60, at 410. 
 86. See, e.g., David S. Schindler, Note, The Class-Based Animus Requirement of 42 
U.S.C. § 1985(3):  A Limiting Strategy Gone Awry?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 88, 99 & n.74 (1985) 
(―The proposed legislation is not intended to be partisan in its beneficent operations.  It is not 
to protect Republicans only in their property, liberty, and lives, but Democrats as well, not 
the colored only, but the whites also; yes, even women and children, all races and all classes, 
will be benefited alike, because we are simply contending for good government and 
righteous laws.‖ (quoting CONG. GLOBE. 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 190 (statement of Rep. 
Charles Buckley))). 
 87. Id. at 100; see also United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 850 
n.15 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (―The Klan‘s goal was to overthrow Republican 
Reconstruction policies both by terrorizing local supporters of those policies in order to 
place sympathetic Democrats in office, and when that failed by supplanting the authority of 
local officials directly with mob violence.‖).  The Republican majority thought the primary 
goal of the Klan was to remove Republicans from power in Southern state governments and 
reestablish ―Democratic hegemony.‖ Fockele, supra note 60, at 409 & n.34.  This included 
seizing control of state governments, reversing the changes made by Reconstruction policies, 
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the Act as a tool to ensure that Reconstructionist policies would continue to 
impact the ―Southern political system.‖88  Although blacks were frequently 
the victims of this violence, they were ―simply one symbol‖ of hated 
Reconstructionist policies.89 
Republican speakers identified three groups which were targeted by the 
Klan:  Unionists, blacks, and Northerners.90  Unionists were targeted 
because of their political beliefs; blacks, because of their electoral support 
for Republican Party candidates as well as their race; and Northerners, both 
because of sectional animus and presumed affiliation with the Republican 
Party.91  Former Klan member Thomas Willeford‘s testimony supported 
this belief.  He testified that at his initiation, he was told that the object of 
the organization was to ―damage the Republican party as much as they 
could,‖ by attacking blacks.92  In fact, to join the Klan, one had to swear to 
―oppose all Radicals and negroes in all their political designs.‖93 
Many have interpreted the actions of the 42nd Congress to be solely 
motivated by race.94  There was, however, no dissent within the Republican 
majority of the 42nd Congress that the Act targeted more than racial 
violence.95  Representative Horace Maynard, for instance, said that the Act 
would cover situations where a group conspires to expel ―all the northern 
men, all the ‗Yankees,‘ [and] all the ‗carpetbaggers‘ from the 
community.‖96  He continued that conspiracies to prevent men from voting 
for the Republicans would also be covered by the statute and concluded that 
he believed it was the duty of Congress to ensure that it was as safe to vote 
for Republican candidates anywhere in the country as it was to vote for 
Democratic candidates.97  He believed that the Klan was targeting three 
groups—Northerners, Unionist Southerners, and Republicans—in addition 
to blacks.98  He also indicated that H.R. 320‘s protection was not limited to 
these three classes.99 
 
and making the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments irrelevant through the use 
of ―political terror.‖ Id. at 409–11. 
 88. See Schindler, supra note 86, at 100–01. 
 89. See Scott, 463 U.S. at 850 n.15. 
 90. See Shatz, supra note 79, at 932. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 
603; Gormley, supra note 68, at 535 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 329 
(testimony of Thomas Willeford)). 
 93. See Gormley, supra note 68, at 535 n.10 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 329 (1871)). 
 94. See infra notes 172, 191, 197, 217 and accompanying text. 
 95. See Cogan, supra note 63, at 562. 
 96. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 310 (1871). 
 97. Id.  Some commenters have argued that—abolitionists aside—Republicans at the 
time were more concerned with strengthening the party than the ―unselfish concern for the 
plight of the freedmen.‖ See, e.g., Shatz, supra note 79, at 934.  For example, at the height of 
Reconstruction, Republicans favored black suffrage in the South where the party needed 
additional votes to defeat Democrats, but opposed enfranchisement in the North where the 
party‘s political power was stronger. See id. at 935. 
 98. See Cogan, supra note 63, at 560–61 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 
309 (1871)). 
 99. See id. 
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The primary objection in the House to the originally proposed language 
of section 2 of H.R. 320 was its potential applicability to any ordinary 
conspiracy.100  Section 2, as originally introduced, may have been broad 
enough to allow for the federal prosecution of a list of criminal offenses 
governed by state law, where at least two people were involved.101  
Moderate and Radical Republicans disagreed over whether the enforcement 
power granted by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was broad enough to 
allow federal prosecution of traditionally state law offenses.102  Democrats 
objected that the original language would allow for the federal prosecution 
of any mere assault and battery, carrying a sentence of up to ten years 
imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.103  Representative Shellabarger denied 
that the statute would federalize ordinary criminal offenses, and he argued 
that the list of offenses served to limit the scope of activities covered by the 
statute.104  He, however, distinguished ordinary crimes from acts that 
prevented others from exercising their constitutional rights and took the 
position that the latter should be punishable by the federal government.105 
In response to these concerns, section 2 was amended to remedy 
conspiracies that deprived people of ―equal protection of the laws‖ or 
enjoyment of ―equal privileges or immunities under the laws,‖ and 
conspiracies to prevent states from protecting equal protection of the law.106  
When the language was amended to limit application to equal protection, it 
was assumed that the statute was still intended to combat Klan violence 
against those identified in the preceding debate.107  Statements by 
Representatives Shellabarger, Cook, and Willard, the authors and sponsors 
of the amended equality language, gave no indication that they believed the 
change limited application of the proposal to cases of racial animus, 
continuing to present it as a remedy to discrimination against Republicans, 
Unionists, Northerners, and Southerners deemed disloyal to the South.108 
The amended version gained approval after Representative Shellabarger 
responded to then-Representative James Garfield‘s suggestion that the bill 
should be limited to private conspiracies ―aimed at particular classes of 
citizens‖ of the type targeted by the Klan.109  Moderate Republicans were 
concerned that the original language would reach crimes generally 
 
 100. See Gormley, supra note 68, at 537; Martin, supra note 14, at 735–36 & n.15. 
 101. See Gormley, supra note 68, at 537. 
 102. Fockele, supra note 60, at 412. 
 103. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 
610–11 (comments by Rep. William Arthur, noting that the offenses listed in the original 
section 2 were offenses that the states punished as felonies or misdemeanors, according to 
the circumstances of each offense and exclaiming ―Shades of Draco and of Jeffreys! [W]here 
is the parallel to this wickedness?‖ to the assault and battery example). 
 104. Fockele, supra note 60, at 413 (citing CONG. GLOBE., 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 382 
(1871) (statement of Rep. Samuel Shellabarger)). 
 105. Id. at 413–14. 
 106. Act of Apr. 20, 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871), ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. 
 107. See Cogan, supra note 63, at 563–65. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See Gormley, supra note 68, at 538. 
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governed by state law, not that the statute would reach rights violations 
motivated by membership in a nonracial class.110 
The Senate debated on H.R. 320 from April 11 to April 14, 1871.111  
Much of the Senate debate centered on the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and a different, unadopted amendment to the proposed 
statute.112  Senator George Edmunds, the floor manager of the bill, 
however, did describe what he believed to be the scope of the bill.  He 
stated that the Act was intended to reach conspiracies formed against men 
because of their political affiliation, religion, or state of origin, but not 
private plots that may grow out of animosity between individuals.113 
On April 20, 1871, the 42nd Congress enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act.114  
Section 1 of the final act created a cause of action against government 
actors acting under the color of law, and exists to the present day, codified 
as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.115  Section 2 of the original act created a federal 
criminal offense and federal civil cause of action for private conspiracies to 
deprive a person of the equal protection of the law or equal enjoyment of 
―privileges and immunities‖ either through direct action or by preventing 
state governments from effectively safeguarding those rights.116  Much of 
section 2 remains to this day in revised form as a provision for civil liability 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.117  Section 3 of the Act authorized the President of 
the United States to use the militia or federal armed forces to quell violence 
or ―insurrection‖ aimed at depriving citizens of their civil rights in a state if 
the state government refuses or fails to take effective action.118  Under the 
provision, the state‘s failure to defend the civil rights of its citizens is the 
equivalent of state action that deprives those rights.119 Congress was 
sufficiently concerned that planned campaigns of severe violence or threats 
of violence in the South would replace legitimate civil authority, actually 
overthrow local governments, or oppose federal authority with force,120 to 
 
 110. See id. 
 111. See 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 
620. 
 112. See id. at 620–50. 
 113. See id. at 623 (comments by Sen. George Edmunds).  In a statement often quoted for 
the proposition that § 1985(3) extends beyond racially motivated conspiracies, Senator 
Edmumds stated while reflecting on a murder in Florida of a man killed because he was from 
Vermont, that ―if in a case like this, it should appear that this conspiracy was formed against 
a man because he was a Democrat . . . a Catholic, . . . a Methodist, or . . . a Vermonter, . . . 
then this section could reach it.‖ Id. 
 114. Act of Apr. 20, 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871), ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; see Shatz, 
supra note 79, at 911. 
 115. See § 1, 17 Stat. at 13; 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  CIVIL RIGHTS, 
supra note 16, at 592. 
 116. See § 2, 17 Stat. at 13–14. 
 117. 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 591; 
see 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012). 
 118. See § 3, 17 Stat. at 14. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Fockele, supra note 60, at 405 & n.9; see § 3–4, 17 Stat. at 14–15. 
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include presidential authority to declare martial law and suspend habeas 
corpus in sections 3 and 4 of the Act.121 
B.   The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence Between Enactment and Bray 
During the century following the enactment of the Ku Klux Klan Act, the 
Supreme Court rendered the broad language of the Act‘s protections 
―largely impotent.‖122  In 1883, in United States v. Harris,123 the Supreme 
Court held the criminal penalties of section 2 of the Act—then codified as 
section 5519 of the Revised Statutes of the United States124—
unconstitutional.125  In Harris, R. G. Harris and nineteen others were 
accused of conspiring to deprive four people of the right to be protected 
from attack while in police custody.126  The Court found that none of the 
Civil War Amendments granted Congress the authority to impose the 
criminal sanctions found in section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act.127 
Nearly five years later, the Court reaffirmed Harris in Baldwin v. 
Franks.128  In Baldwin, Thomas Baldwin, in a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, challenged his detention by U.S. Marshal C.J. Franks‘s for violating 
the criminal section of the Ku Klux Klan Act.129  Franks claimed that unlike 
Harris, this application of the Act was constitutional because the federal 
government was obligated by treaty to protect the rights of Chinese subjects 
on American soil.130  The Court held that Harris controlled and dismissed 
the distinction asserted by Franks because the section of the Act struck 
down in Harris was not separable from a specific section protecting foreign 
nationals.131 
The civil claims section of the Ku Klux Klan Act was rarely invoked 
after its criminal counterpart was struck down,132 possibly because Harris 
 
 121. See § 3–4, 17 Stat. at 14–15. 
 122. See Schindler, supra note 86, at 89. 
 123. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
 124. Id. at 632. 
 125. Id. at 644. 
 126. See id. at 629–32.  R.G. Harris and nineteen others allegedly ―beat[], bruis[ed], 
wound[ed], and otherwise ill-treat[ed]‖ four individuals who, at the time of the incident, 
were being held in the custody a deputy sheriff in Crockett County, Tennessee, for some 
other criminal offense. Id. 
 127. See id. at 641 (holding that the guarantee of equal protection under the law is broader 
than the protection against involuntary servitude); id. at 638 (holding that the enforcement 
authority granted to Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits legislation to 
guarantee protection from state action, but not legislation to suppress ―crime within the 
states‖); id. at 637 (holding that the Fifteenth Amendment does not grant Congress the 
authority to enact the Act‘s criminal penalties because (1) the Amendment does not provide 
citizens with a right to vote, but only protects them from racially discriminatory deprivations 
of that right and (2) the statute is not tailored to remedy voting rights violations). 
 128. See 120 U.S. 678, 685 (1887). 
 129. See id. at 679–82.  Baldwin was accused of conspiring to and carrying out the forced 
expulsion of a group of ―Chinese aliens‖ from the town of Nicolaus, California. Id. at 680–
82. 
 130. See id. at 680–81, 685–86. 
 131. See id. at 685–86. 
 132. See Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‘n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 371 (1979) 
(noting that, after the Court invalidated the criminal offence created by the Ku Klux Klan 
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and Baldwin could be read to limit the statute to remedy violations of the 
Reconstruction Amendments.133  In 1951, after nearly seventy years of 
silence,134 the civil cause of action came before the Court.  In Collins v. 
Hardyman,135 political club members who were meeting to oppose the 
Marshall Plan alleged that the defendants conspired to disrupt the club‘s 
meetings,136 and that the conspiracy was actionable under what is now 42 
U.S.C. § 1985(3).137  The district court dismissed the case because it found 
that state action was necessary to state a claim under the statute.138  The 
Ninth Circuit reversed,139 reasoning that, if Congress had intended a state 
action requirement, it would have included one similar to section 1 of the 
Klan Act,140 today‘s 42 U.S.C. § 1983.141  The U.S. Supreme Court 
subsequently reversed the Ninth Circuit.142  The Court interpreted 
§ 1985(3) to require state action in furtherance of a conspiracy to deprive 
equal protection of the law.143  The Court found that, absent state action 
that deprived plaintiffs of legal recourse in California state courts, 
defendants may have been guilty of violating local penal laws but not of 
depriving the plaintiffs of equal protection of the law.144 
The section ―languished in relative obscurity‖ until 1971,145 when the 
Court took up Griffin v. Breckenridge.146  In Griffin, two white adults 
assaulted the black passengers of a car traveling in Mississippi under the 
mistaken belief that the owner of the car was working to secure civil rights 
for blacks.147  The defendants drove their truck into the path of the car, 
forced the passengers out of the car, prevented them from escaping, and 
 
Act, the civil provisions remained valid but were ―rarely, if ever, invoked‖); Cogan, supra 
note 64, at 532. 
 133. See Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 689–90 (1887); United States v. Harris, 106 
U.S. 629, 636–38, 641 (1883). 
 134. See Beth E. Hansen, Note, ―Invidiously Discriminatory Animus‖—A Class Based on 
Gender and Gestation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3):  Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., 24 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1097, 1105 (1991). 
 135. 341 U.S. 651 (1951). 
 136. Id. at 653–54.  Commentators have indicated that this means the Collins Court 
assumed members of political organizations were a protected class under the statute. See, 
e.g., Cogan, supra note 63, at 525. 
 137. See Collins, 341 U.S. at 653; 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2012). 
 138. See Collins, 341 U.S at 656. 
 139. See id. 
 140. Hardyman v. Collins, 183 F.2d 308, 311 (9th Cir. 1950). 
 141. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 142. See Collins, 341 U.S. at 663. 
 143. See id. at 661. 
 144. See id.  The Court stated that ―[s]uch private discrimination is not inequality before 
the law unless there is some manipulation of the law or its agencies to give sanction or 
sanctuary for doing so.‖ Id.  A commentator has argued that the Court‘s reading of a state 
action requirement within both the criminal portion of the original statute and the civil 
remedy in § 1985(3) is a result of reading the principle of federalism into the statute. See 
Cogan, supra note 63, at 522–24.  States were the traditional defenders of the rights of their 
citizens and the Fourteenth Amendment only granted the federal government legislative 
authority to ensure the states continued to fulfill this role. See id. 
 145. Schindler, supra note 86, at 89. 
 146. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). 
 147. Id. at 90. 
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threatened them with guns, while clubbing the owner of the car.148  The 
district court dismissed the complaint and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, both 
relying on Collins.149  The Griffin Court overturned Collins and held that, 
despite linguistic similarities between § 1985(3) and the Equal Protection 
Clause, the statute contained no explicit requirement of state action.150  The 
Court, like the Ninth Circuit in Collins, reasoned that, if Congress intended 
a state action requirement, it would have included one like it did in § 1983, 
and to read that requirement into § 1985(3) would render it redundant.151  
The Court also found that § 1985(3) was intended to remedy violence by 
private actors to deprive equal protection of rights.152  The Court declared 
that, absent the state action requirement, the proper inquiry was whether 
Congress had the power to reach the private conspiracy alleged in the given 
case.153  The Court found that § 1985(3) could reach private conspiracies to 
deprive a person of equal protection of the right to interstate travel.154 
In reaching this holding, the Griffin Court outlined the elements for a 
§ 1985(3) claim.  First, a court must determine whether the alleged conduct 
falls within the purview of the statute.155  A plaintiff must sufficiently 
allege that (1) at least two people conspired to go in disguise on the 
highway or trespass on another‘s property (2) to deprive a person or class of 
persons of equal protection of, or equal privileges and immunities under the 
law (3) and that at least one conspirator acted in furtherance of the 
conspiracy (4) causing injury to a person or property or depriving a person 
of exercising a right or privilege of a citizen of the nation.156  Second, the 
trial court must examine the right violated to determine whether Congress 
has the constitutional authority to regulate or prohibit the conduct alleged in 
the particular case.157 
Out of concern—shared by the 42nd Congress—that the statute would 
become a general federal action for ―tortious, conspiratorial interferences‖ 
with the rights of others,158 the Court read into the equal protection 
language of the statute a requirement that conspiracies must be motivated 
by ―racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory 
 
 148. Id. at 90–91. 
 149. Id. at 92. 
 150. Id. at 96–97.  Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the Amendment‘s scope 
to regulation of state actions that deprive protected rights. See United States v. Cruikshank, 
92 U.S. 542, 554–55 (1875).  The notion of state action has expanded to include some 
activities of private actors. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18 (1948) (state 
enforcement of private covenants). 
 151. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 98–99; see also supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 152. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 100. 
 153. Id. at 104. 
 154. Id. at 105. 
 155. Fockele, supra note 60, at 406 (citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102–03). 
 156. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102–03. 
 157. Fockele, supra note 60, at 406 (citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 104–07).  Congress may 
act against conspiracies implicating its commerce power, for the protection of ―rights of 
national citizenship,‖ or pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment (deprivation of rights by 
state or local government actors). See id. 
 158. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101; Russell, supra note 71, at 74. 
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animus.‖159  This also allowed the Court to avoid the question of the 
constitutionality of a federal tort statute.160  The Court found that the 
plaintiffs‘ allegation of racial motivation fulfilled the class animus 
requirement.161  Consequently, the Court concluded it need not define other 
examples of class-based animus sufficient to state a § 1985(3) claim.162 
Twenty-two years after the Griffin Court indicated that § 1985(3) may 
protect members of nonracial classes,163 the Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to clarify how it defined nonracial classes of persons protected 
by § 1985(3), but failed to do so.  In United Brotherhood of Carpenters 
Local 610 v. Scott,164 the local construction trades union organized a protest 
against a Texas construction company for hiring nonunion labor.165  
Protesters attacked company employees and threatened to continue the 
violence until all nonunion workers left town and the company changed its 
hiring practices.166  The Court faced the question of whether a nonracial 
group could state a conspiracy claim under § 1985(3) against a labor union 
and its supporters, aimed at depriving the nonunion laborers of their free 
associational right not to join a union.167  The Court echoed the conern 
voiced in Griffin, that an overly expansive interpretation of § 1985(3) 
would allow claims for general tortious interference with one‘s civil 
rights.168  The Court held that discrimination against nonunion laborers 
motivated by disapproval of their economic activities or beliefs was not 
sufficient to constitute class-based animus.169  However, the Court neither 
defined nonracial class-based animus, nor explicitly excluded all nonracial 
class-based animus from the statute‘s protections.170 
Justices on the Court disagreed over whether the legislative history of 
§ 1985(3) supported a racial animus requirement.171  The majority in Scott 
was convinced that the purpose of § 1985(3) was to combat the Ku Klux 
Klan‘s violent efforts to resist black emancipation and voting.172  In the 
Court‘s view, Republicans, whites, and Northerners were subject to 
violence because of their perceived sympathy for blacks, not because of any 
independent hatred toward those groups.173  After acknowledging that there 
 
 159. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 102 & n.9. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 102. 
 164. See United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983). 
 165. See id. at 827–28. 
 166. Id. at 828. 
 167. See id. at 830, 836–38. 
 168. See id. at 837. 
 169. See id. at 838.  The Court also held that there was a state action requirement for 
§ 1985(3) claims where the conspirators violated a right protected by the federal government 
against the states. See id. at 832–33. 
 170. See id. at 837–39. 
 171. See id. at 836–37; id. at 851–52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 172. See id. at 836 (majority opinion) (―The central theme of the bill‘s proponents was 
that the Klan and others were forcibly resisting efforts to emancipate Negroes and give them 
equal access to political power.‖). 
 173. See id. 
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is legislative history supporting a broader interpretation of legislative intent, 
the Court concluded that Congress did not intend the statute to address 
conspiracies motivated solely by economic animus.174  The Court elected 
not to answer whether Congress intended the statute to address conspiracies 
solely motivated by political affiliation because neither party presented 
evidence of legislative intent not considered by the Griffin Court.175 
However, the Court in dicta doubted that § 1985(3) should or was 
intended to apply to purely political conspiracies.176  The majority was not 
convinced that the Klan attacked Republicans in the South for any partisan 
reason independent of their support for black legal and political equality.177  
The Court was concerned that opening § 1985(3) to political conspiracies 
would expand the statute beyond the general tort law feared by some of the 
42nd Congress‘s moderate Republicans to include minor disputes over one 
party heckling another.178 
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun expressed a more expansive view of the 
underlying evil motivating the 42nd Congress to act.179  Justice Blackmun 
was convinced that the 42nd Congress viewed Klan violence as motivated 
by the political viewpoints of its victims, including a general opposition to 
Reconstruction policies in the South.180  Unlike the majority opinion,181 
Justice Blackmun examined a broader set of statements from the debates 
prior to the passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act.182  Justice Blackmun argued 
that the principal difference between the radical and moderate factions of 
 
 174. See id. at 837–38.  The Court concluded that carpetbaggers were not targeted in the 
South because of their free labor and capital ideology but because they were either 
Republicans or supporters of black suffrage. Id. at 838.  The Court also quoted Senator John 
Pool who argued that whenever a Northerner entered the South, the Northerner would no 
longer be considered a carpetbagger if they joined or served the needs of the Democrats. See 
id. at 838 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 607 (1871) (statement of Sen. Pool)). 
 175. See id. at 837. 
 176. See id. at 836 (―Although we have examined with some care the legislative history 
that has been marshaled in support of the position that Congress meant to forbid wholly non-
racial, but politically motivated conspiracies, we find difficult the question whether 
§ 1985(3) provided a remedy for every concerted effort by one political group to nullify the 
influence of or do other injury to a competing group by use of otherwise unlawful means.‖). 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id. at 837. 
 179. See id. at 839 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (―The Ku Klux Klan Act was the 
Reconstruction Congress‘ response to politically motivated mob violence in the Postbellum 
South designed to intimidate persons in the exercise of their legal rights.‖ (emphasis added)). 
 180. See id. at 851. 
 181. See Cogan, supra note 63, at 536.  There was little discussion in the Scott decision of 
the specific parts of the legislative history of § 1985(3) that support the contention that racial 
discrimination ―was the central concern of Congress‖; the only source the Scott Court cited 
for the proposition—its opinion in Griffin—made the statement without referring to a source 
for support. See id. (quoting Scott, 463 U.S. at 835 (majority opinion)).  An example of the 
Scott majority not looking searchingly into the legislative history is that they seemingly 
ignored the House rejection of a Senate amendment that would have provided further 
protections if local government subdivisions deprived certain rights only because of the 
target‘s ―race, color, or previous condition of servitude.‖ See id. at 567–68 (quoting CONG. 
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871)). 
 182. See Scott, 463 U.S. at 841–46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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the Republican Party was the scope of activity that could be reached by the 
statute, not the scope of persons who may be protected by the statute.183 
In 1993, the Supreme Court once more narrowed how classes protected 
by § 1985(3) may be defined.  In Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health 
Clinic,184 the court excluded definitions of classes based solely on common 
conduct, belief, or injury.185  In Bray, pro-life activists organized by 
Operation Rescue, an unincorporated association of abortion opponents, 
obstructed access to abortion clinics in the Washington, D.C. area and, on at 
least one occasion, forced a clinic to close for more than six hours.186  Nine 
abortion clinics and five women‘s rights groups brought a § 1985(3) claim 
against Operation Rescue and six protestors for conspiring to infringe upon 
the right to practice and have access to abortions.187  The Court 
distinguished the potential class of women from a class of women who 
support abortion rights or seek abortions.188  The Court concluded that the 
latter could not be protected by § 1985(3), because to allow classes defined 
by the ―desire to engage in conduct that the [] defendant disfavors‖ would 
expand § 1985(3) into a general tort law.189 
C.   The Circuit Court Divide on Racial Animus Requirement 
The Supreme Court‘s refusal to decide whether to apply the racial animus 
requirement to political conspiracies under § 1985(3) left the circuit courts 
to determine whether to apply the requirement.  Part I.C.1 presents the 
majority position among the circuits:  racial animus is a required element of 
politically motivated conspiracy claims.  Part I.C.2 presents the minority 
position:  Section 1985(3) was intended to apply to discrimination 
motivated exclusively by political party animus.  Part I.C.3 briefly 
introduces the potentially inconsistent holdings in the Second Circuit from 
before and after Scott. 
1.   Majority:  Racial Animus Is Required for Political Conspiracies 
Though the Supreme Court withheld judgment on whether Congress 
intended a racial animus requirement for § 1985(3) conspiracy claims,190 
eight of the eleven circuits deciding the issue were convinced by either 
 
 183. See id. at 842–43. 
 184. 506 U.S. 263 (1993). 
 185. Id. at 269–70. 
 186. See id. at 266, 284. 
 187. See id. at 266; Nat‘l Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1487 
(E.D. Va. 1989) aff’d, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990) judgment rev’d in part, vacated in part 
sub nom. Bray, 506 U.S. 263. 
 188. See id.  The Court found that it need not decide whether women as a class were 
protected by § 1985(3) because the acts alleged in the case were motivated either by the 
defendants‘ opposition to abortions or defendants‘ desire to save unborn children, not by the 
plaintiffs‘ gender itself. Id. at 269–70. 
 189. See id. at 269–71. 
 190. See supra notes 170, 175 and accompanying text. 
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Griffin or the Scott dicta to impose such a requirement.191  Within two years 
of the Scott decision, three circuits concluded that a person claiming that 
they were discriminated against because of their political affiliation must 
assert some racial motivation to sustain a claim pursuant to § 1985(3). 
In Harrison v. KVAT Food Management, Inc.,192 the Fourth Circuit 
adopted the view of the majority in Scott that the Ku Klux Klan Act was a 
response to racially motivated violence.193  James Harrison, an employee of 
KVAT Food Management, claimed that he was fired from his job because 
he announced his candidacy for the Republican nomination for countywide 
office.194  Harrison contended that other employees were permitted to run 
for office as Democrats without being fired.195  The Fourth Circuit was 
convinced by the Scott dicta that the 42nd Congress‘s primary concern was 
combatting violent efforts to block implementation of the Civil War 
Amendments.196  Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that, absent further 
evidence of congressional intent, the court should not extend the scope of 
§ 1985(3) to any class not approved by the Supreme Court.197  
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit requires racial animus as an element of 
§ 1985(3) conspiracy claims.198 
In Brown v. Reardon,199 the Tenth Circuit held that politically motivated 
§ 1985(3) claims must have a racial component.200  Brown was a 
consolidation of four cases against Kansas City, Kansas, and a number of 
city officials.201  In Brown, four city employees were laid off after refusing 
to purchase tickets to their employers‘ political fundraiser or make 
contributions to their employers‘ political organization.202  The plaintiffs 
 
 191. See, e.g., Perez-Sanchez v. Pub. Bldg. Auth., 531 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 2008) (―We 
find the Supreme Court‘s dicta in Scott and the reasoning of our sister circuits persuasive.  
Recognizing a claim under § 1985(3) for discrimination due to political affiliation would 
open the federal courts to a wide variety of claims, ranging from employment disputes such 
as this one to election-related claims.  We thus decline to extend § 1985(3)‘s protection to 
political affiliation.‖); Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2006) (―As to 
both groups, however, the invidiously discriminatory animus behind the Klan‘s actions was 
motivated by racial hatred, not by its victims‘ political party affiliation.‖); Grimes v. Smith, 
776 F.2d 1359, 1366 (7th Cir. 1985) (―The import of both Griffin and Scott is that the 
legislative history of § 1985(3) does not support extending the statute to include conspiracies 
other than those motivated by a racial, class-based animus against ‗Negroes and their 
supporters.‘‖); Brown v. Reardon, 770 F.2d 896, 905 (10th Cir. 1985) (rejecting class 
definitions broader than ―race, sex, religion, or national origin‖); Harrison v. KVAT Food 
Mgmt., Inc., 766 F.2d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 1985) (―In analyzing the Scott decision, we find 
little support for the contention that § 1985(3) includes in its scope of protection the victims 
of purely political conspiracies.‖). 
 192. 766 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 193. See id. at 157 (―The passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act was in response to widespread 
violence and acts of terror directed at blacks and their supporters in the postwar South.‖). 
 194. Id. at 156. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. at 162. 
 197. See id. at 161. 
 198. See id. 
 199. 770 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 200. See id. at 907. 
 201. Id. at 897. 
 202. Id. 
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claimed that they were terminated because of their membership in a class 
defined by opposition to the political activities of their employers.203  The 
Tenth Circuit found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the class-based animus 
requirement from Griffin and Scott.204  The court read Scott and Griffin to 
require racial animus to prevent the statute from becoming a general tort 
law.205  In light of Scott, the Tenth Circuit concluded that ―[t]he 
statute . . . was intended . . . to provide redress for victims of conspiracies 
impelled by a commingling of racial and political motives.‖206 
In Grimes v. Smith,207 the Seventh Circuit went further and held that 
§ 1985(3) only remedies conspiracies based on racial, class-based 
animus.208  In Grimes, Doug Grimes and two voters claimed that a number 
of individuals conspired to mislead voters to prevent him from winning the 
Democratic Primary for City Judge by placing a person with a name similar 
to Grimes on the ballot.209  Grimes claimed that the conspiracy deprived 
him of the right of meaningful participation in electoral politics.210  The 
Seventh Circuit reasoned that to interpret § 1985(3) so broadly would 
require courts to determine the outcome of elections, determine whether a 
candidate is a serious candidate or not, and face cases of ―garden-
variety . . . vote fraud,‖ which neither the federal courts nor § 1985(3) are 
equipped to address.211  Based on the Scott analysis of legislative history, 
the Seventh Circuit held that § 1985(3) is limited to conspiracies motivated 
by racial animus.212 
More recently, the Third Circuit decided Farber v. City of Paterson.213  
Roberta Farber was an administrative employee whose employment may 
have been subject to the city‘s collective bargaining agreement with the 
local public employees union.214  The Third Circuit addressed the question 
of whether the violence that prompted the Ku Klux Klan Act was racially 
motivated or politically motivated.215  The court discounted the political 
motivations of Klan violence, including blocking carpetbaggers from 
profiting off of the economic condition of the South and the general disdain 
 
 203. See id. at 905. 
 204. See id. at 905–06.  The Tenth Circuit had interpreted Griffin to require that class 
animus be based on race, gender, religion, or national origin. See id. at 905. 
 205. See id. at 906. 
 206. Id. at 907 (emphasis added) (quoting Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 623 (7th 
Cir. 1979)). 
 207. 776 F.2d 1359 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 208. See id. at 1366. 
 209. See id. at 1360–63. 
 210. See id. at 1363. 
 211. See id. at 1367. 
 212. See id. at 1366. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the intent of Congress was to 
remedy violence against blacks and against those targeted because of their support for 
blacks. Id. 
 213. 440 F.3d 131 (3rd Cir. 2006). 
 214. See id. at 133.  The court commented that this case appeared to be one of political 
patronage, where the newly elected Democratic mayor fired city employees who supported 
the former Republican incumbent. Id. at 132–33. 
 215. Id. at 134–35. 
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for Republicans.216  As a result, the court concluded that the targeting of 
members of those groups was incidental to the Klan‘s targeting of blacks 
and their perceived allies.217  The court also concluded that political animus 
was insufficiently ―invidious‖ to support a § 1985(3) claim.218 
The common thread in these cases is the circuit courts‘ reliance on the 
Scott Court‘s examination and interpretation of § 1985(3)‘s legislative 
history—an inquiry concentrated on whether Congress intended to address 
economic class-based animus. 
2.   Minority Position:  Political Affiliation Animus 
Is Individually Recognized 
Two circuit courts maintained their pre-Scott holdings that animosity 
toward a person‘s political affiliation or association was sufficient to fulfill 
the intent requirement of § 1985(3).  The Sixth Circuit continued to hold 
that the racial animus requirement is not included in the statute and, absent 
clear Supreme Court precedent requiring racial animus, the Sixth Circuit is 
bound by its own precedent.219  The Fifth Circuit also held that classes 
characterized by their ―political beliefs or associations‖ are protected under 
§ 1985(3).220  The Fifth Circuit found that Congress intended to protect 
those all of those targeted by the Ku Klux Klan including whites, who were 
targeted because of their political beliefs or affiliation with a political 
party.221 
The Sixth Circuit maintained its pre-Scott position that political 
affiliation is a class protected by § 1985(3).  In Cameron v. Brock,222 
opponents to the election of the sitting sheriff claimed that the defendants 
destroyed their political pamphlets under an implicit threat of arrest and 
arrested other members of the sheriff‘s opposition while passing out 
flyers.223  The court rejected the racial animus requirement for three 
reasons:  (1) Section 1985(3) does not state a racial discrimination 
requirement; (2) the Supreme Court in Griffin declined to rule on whether 
nonracial discrimination was covered; and (3) the Court in Snowden v. 
Hughes224 indicated that conspiracies motivated by animus against 
nonracial groups may be actionable.225  Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit 
followed its own precedent and accepted nonracial discrimination as 
sufficient to meet the animus requirement in Griffin.226 
 
 216. See id. at 140–41. 
 217. See id. 
 218. See id. at 138. 
 219. See Conklin v. Lovely, 834 F.2d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 1987); Cameron v. Brock, 473 
F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973). 
 220. See McLean v. Int‘l Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting 
Kimble v. D. J. McDuffy, Inc., 623 F.2d 1060, 1066 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 221. See Kimble v. D. J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 347 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 222. 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973). 
 223. Id. at 609. 
 224. 321 U.S. 1 (1944). 
 225. See Cameron, 473 F.2d at 610. 
 226. See id. 
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In Conklin v. Lovely,227 an employee of both the County Clerk and 
County Treasurer, each Republicans, brought a § 1985(3) claim alleging 
that she was terminated from her position because of her support for the 
incumbent Democrat County Prosecuting Attorney against a Republican 
challenger.228  The Sixth Circuit narrowly read Scott to only exclude 
economic affinity or interest groups from the protection of § 1985(3).229  
Because the Supreme Court came to no clear holding regarding the racial 
animus requirement and political party–based discrimination, the Sixth 
Circuit held that it was required to follow its own precedent, permitting 
claims by purely political groups.230 
In McLean v. International Harvester Co.,231 the Fifth Circuit maintained 
the validity of political affiliation–motivated conspiracy claims under 
§ 1985(3).232  In McLean, George McLean claimed he was in a class of 
employees scapegoated in a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act investigation 
into both him and his employer.233  The Fifth Circuit‘s position on 
§ 1985(3) is that it protects against conspiracies motivated by animus 
against racial groups, groups defined by other immutable characteristics, 
and groups defined by common political ideology.234  The court 
acknowledged the Scott dicta‘s concern about the scope of the statute 
beyond race-based claims but continued to apply the circuit‘s pre-Scott 
test.235  Applying the test, the court dismissed the claim because plea 
bargain scapegoats did not fall into a protected category.236 
3.   The Second Circuit Is Unsettled After Scott 
In light of the Scott dicta, the Second Circuit shifted its interpretation of 
§ 1985(3) but left its district courts without clear guidance to follow 
regarding political conspiracies.  Before the Scott decision, the Second 
Circuit in Keating v. Carey237 held that political affiliation was a class 
protected by § 1985(3).238  After Scott, the Second Circuit in Gleason v. 
 
 227. 834 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 228. See id. at 544–45. 
 229. See id. at 548–49.  The Sixth Circuit held that the Scott Court limited its own holding 
to economic animus in the Court‘s dicta, which indicated its holding would not change if 
§ 1985(3) covered political animus–motivated conspiracies. Id. at 549. 
 230. See id.  For a broader discussion of the Sixth Circuit‘s balance between Scott and its 
own pre-Scott precedent, see generally Martin, supra note 14. 
 231. 817 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 232. See id. at 1219 (citing Kimble v. D. J. McDuffy, Inc., 623 F.2d 1060, 1066 (5th Cir. 
1980)). 
 233. See id. at 1218. 
 234. See id. at 1219 (citing Kimble, 623 F.2d at 1066).  The court stated two categories 
that the circuit recognized:  ―those characterized by ‗political beliefs or associations‘‖ and 
―those characterized by ‗some inherited or immutable characteristic.‘‖ Id. (quoting Kimble, 
623 F.2d at 1066).  Though race is among the ―inherited or immutable characteristic[s]‖ 
mentioned in McLean, this Note separates race as a category for easier comparison with 
cases that limit class-based animus to exclusively racial animus. 
 235. See id. at 1218–19. 
 236. See id. at 1219. 
 237. 706 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 238. See id. at 387. 
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McBride239 called the continued viability of Keating into question because 
of the Scott Court‘s interpretation § 1985(3)‘s legislative history.240  The 
court refrained from deciding the question because it was unnecessary to 
resolve the case.241  Part II examines Keating and Gleason in greater detail. 
II.  SECOND CIRCUIT DECISIONS CAUSE DISTRICT COURT CONFUSION 
The Second Circuit‘s inability to address the question of politically 
motivated conspiracies—left open by Scott—has led to a split among the 
district courts of the Second Circuit that is remarkably similar to the 
national circuit split.  Part II.A discusses the Second Circuit‘s recognition of 
political animus–based § 1985(3) claims before Scott.  Part II.B examines 
the Second Circuit‘s narrowed scope of actionable § 1985(3) clams in light 
of the dicta in Scott.  Part II.C explores the district courts‘ divergent 
attempts to reconcile Second Circuit precedent applicable to § 1985(3) 
claims brought against members of politically motivated conspiracies. 
A.   Before Scott:  The Second Circuit Recognizes Political Animus 
Before Scott, the Second Circuit unambiguously recognized the 
applicability of § 1985(3) to conspiracies motivated solely by political 
affiliation.242  In Keating v. Carey—decided the same year as, but without 
the benefit of, Scott—Robert Keating was one of nine employees chosen to 
run the office now known as the Division of Criminal Justice Services.243  
Keating‘s background as a journalist covering law enforcement qualified 
him to be an Associate Public Information Specialist for the division.244  
When Keating took the job, he was told that the position came with 
protections equivalent to tenured competitive civil servants.245  After 
Democratic Governor Hugh Carey was elected, Keating was told that he 
was to be terminated because of his Republican Party affiliation.246  
Keating brought claims under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986.247  
Keating based his § 1985(3) claim on his political affiliation–motivated 
termination, and an alleged conspiracy to both hide his legally enforceable 
tenure rights from him and deter him from bringing suit in federal court.248  
The district court, in a footnote, dismissed Keating‘s § 1985(3) claim 
because he failed to allege defendants motive was class based.249 
 
 239. 869 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 240. See id. at 695. 
 241. See id. 
 242. See Keating, 706 F.2d at 387. 
 243. Id. at 380. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 379–80. 
 248. Id. at 380.  Keating claimed that the defendants alternatively threatened to bring up 
fabricated charges against him if he brought suit and promised replacement employment for 
Keating‘s silence. Id. 
 249. Id. at 381. 
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The Second Circuit held that discrimination motivated by membership in 
the Republican Party was actionable under § 1985(3).250  Based on the 
extensive references to Klan violence against Republicans in the statute‘s 
legislative history,251 the court found the exclusion of political affiliation–
based discrimination from statutory protection to be indefensible.252  
According to the court, Congress saw the Ku Klux Klan not ―solely as a 
racist organization . . . but as a political organization intent on establishing 
Democratic hegemony in the South,‖ by attacking blacks, carpetbaggers 
and Southern ―men of union sentiment.‖253 
The court was critical of Judge Meskill‘s dissenting argument that the 
statute was limited to race-based conspiracies because Klan attacks on 
Republicans were racially motivated.254  Judge Meskill argued that the Klan 
only attacked Republicans because they supported equal legal rights for 
blacks, including suffrage.255  The majority concluded that this ignored the 
historical context of the South‘s nonracial resentment against Northern 
occupation and exploitation of the South.256 
B.   After Scott:  The Gleason Dicta Indicates a Limiting of Scope 
In Gleason v. McBride,257 decided five years after Scott, the Second 
Circuit was more circumspect about whether § 1985(3) protected victims of 
purely political conflicts.  In light of Scott, the Second Circuit signaled a 
narrowing of what it would recognize as actionable class-based 
discrimination, leaving unclear whether the circuit would continue to 
recognize political party class-based animus. 
Gleason concerned a conspiracy motivated by the claimant‘s political 
opposition to the mayor of the Village of Mount Kisko.258  Thomas Gleason 
claimed that he was targeted for arrest and conviction for the harassment of 
a village teenager, because he challenged the sitting village mayor for 
reelection as an independent candidate.259  The district court found that 
opposition to a candidate for office as a political independent could not 
define a class protected by § 1985(3).260  In affirming, the circuit court 
examined how the Scott decision impacted its own holding in Keating.261  
While finding that Gleason, as a political independent, failed to claim that 
he was targeted because of his political affiliation, the Gleason court noted 
 
 250. See id. at 387. 
 251. See supra Part I.A. 
 252. See Keating, 706 F.2d at 387. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See id. at 387 n.17. 
 255. See id. at 393–94 (Meskill, J., dissenting). 
 256. See id. at 387 n.17 (majority opinion); see also supra Part I.A. 
 257. 869 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 258. See id. at 690–91, 694. 
 259. See id. at 690–91. 
 260. See Gleason v. McBride, 715 F. Supp. 59, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 261. See Gleason, 869 F.2d at 694–95. 
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that § 1985(3) might no longer extend to discrimination against political 
groups absent racial motivation.262 
But, just as the Supreme Court left the question open in Scott, the Second 
Circuit did not decide whether partisan animus against a member of another 
political party was sufficient to state a § 1985(3) claim.  The court found no 
need to address the issue further because Gleason (1) did not claim to be a 
member of a political party and (2) claimed to have been discriminated 
against because of his individual actions rather than class-based animus.263  
Though the Second Circuit has yet to readdress political affiliation–based 
conspiracies, the Second Circuit has consistently held that that political or 
shared ideology–based conspiracies, absent race or political affiliation, are 
not actionable under § 1985(3).264 
C.   District Courts Split on Applying Keating and Gleason 
The district courts within the Second Circuit have taken two approaches 
over whether to impose a racial animus requirement on § 1985(3) political 
conspiracies after the Gleason court‘s dicta called Keating‘s validity into 
doubt.  Part II.C.1 explores cases from the Eastern and Northern Districts of 
New York, which continue to follow Keating.  Part II.C.2 discusses cases in 
the Southern and Western Districts of New York, which have articulated a 
narrower scope of § 1985(3) in light of Gleason and Scott.  Part II.C.3 
explores District of Connecticut cases which, although they do not involve 
claims of purely political animus, lean toward Keating. 
1.   Approach One:  Racial Animus Required 
Absent Political Party Animus 
Judges in the Eastern and Northern Districts of New York have attempted 
to reconcile the holdings of Gleason and Keating.  In these districts, 
plaintiffs need not meet the racial animus requirement for claims involving 
political affiliation class–based conspiracies, but must satisfy the 
 
 262. See id. at 695 (citing United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 
836–37 (1983)). 
 263. See id.  The court further noted that it agreed with a portion of Justice Blackmun‘s 
dissent in Scott, where he stated that ―the intended victims [of discrimination] must be 
victims not because of any personal malice the conspirators have toward them, but because 
of their membership in or affiliation with a particular class.‖ Id. (quoting Scott, 463 U.S. at 
850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).  This is consistent with the Supreme Court‘s later holding in 
Bray that a class or class-based animus could not be defined by opposition to abortion. See 
supra notes 185–89 and accompanying text. 
 264. See Arteta v. County of Orange, 141 F. App‘x 3, 8 (2d Cir. 2005) (refusing to 
recognize political opponents as a class); Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 
1996) (applying Scott to reject § 1985(3) claim that defendants ―discriminated against [the 
plaintiff] because of his leadership role in protesting the change in work conditions‖).  Arteta 
was another case where government employees alleged that an elected official caused them 
injury because they opposed his election. Arteta, 141 F. App‘x at 8.  The court did not 
mention Keating or address the Gleason dicta calling Keating into question, but held that 
Gleason applied because the plaintiffs did not claim party affiliation as a motivating factor. 
See id. 
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requirement for claims involving class-based animus defined by political 
opposition to a candidate, governmental action, policy, or issue. 
In Platsky v. Kilpatrick,265 Judge Glasser in the Eastern District found 
that Keating and Gleason could be reconciled, preserving both as good 
law.266  In Platsky, Henry Platsky claimed that he suffered harassment, 
intimidation, false arrest, and eviction because he was an avowed Socialist 
who belonged to a number of Socialist organizations.267  The court chose 
not to decide the viability of Keating because it found insufficient evidence 
linking any animus to the defendants‘ actions.268 
However, Judge Glasser, assuming Keating remained good law after 
Scott and Gleason, identified plausible interpretations of the two cases so 
that Gleason would not overrule Keating.269  The court read Keating to hold 
that political animus, like racial animus, could fulfill the class and intent 
requirements of § 1985(3).270  The court then read Gleason to exclude 
claims based on opposing political views, support or opposition for a 
candidate, or opposition to governmental policies.271  Following this 
approach, Gleason limits actionable political animus to animus based on 
one‘s political party affiliation.272 
In 2011, the Eastern District in Fishman v. County of Nassau273 
continued to apply Keating to § 1985(3) conspiracy claims.274  Alan 
Fishman claimed that he was dismissed from his position as Special 
Assistant to the Clerk of the Legislature for the newly Republican-
controlled Nassau County legislature because he was a Democratic County 
Committee member.275  Special Assistant to the Clerk of the Legislature is 
a bipartisan position serving both party caucuses with no political affiliation 
requirement.276  The court held that, because the warnings in both Scott and 
Gleason were dicta, Keating‘s rejection of a racial requirement for political 
party–motivated conspiracies remained good law.277 
Even as recently as this year, Eastern District of New York opinions 
acknowledged that the Second Circuit has not clearly decided whether 
discrimination based on political party membership qualifies as class-based 
animus.278 
 
 265. 806 F. Supp. 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 266. See id. at 362–63. 
 267. See id. at 359–60, 363. 
 268. Id. at 363. 
 269. See id. at 362–63. 
 270. See id. 
 271. See id. 
 272. See id. 
 273. No. 10 CV 3231(DRH)(AKT), 2011 WL 3919713 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2011). 
 274. See id. at *9. 
 275. See id. at *2. 
 276. See id. at *1. 
 277. See id. at *9. 
 278. See, e.g., Frasco v. Mastic Beach Prop. Owners‘ Ass‘n, No. 12-CV-2756 
(JFB)(WDW), 2014 WL 3735870, at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2014) (dismissing § 1985(3) 
claim based on class defined by support for village incorporation); Fotopolous v. Bd. of Fire 
Comm‘rs of Hicksville Fire Dist., No. 11-CV-5532(MKB), 2014 WL 1315241, at *17 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (―Although it is unclear whether under Second Circuit law a 
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The Northern District of New York similarly distinguishes claims of 
conspiracies motivated by shared political ideals or positions from 
conspiracies motivated by political party membership.  In Barber v. 
Winn,279 the Northern District of New York interpreted Gleason narrowly 
to exclude prospective classes defined by ―political or philosophical 
opposition‖ to a candidate or political issue.280  In Barber, plaintiffs Robert 
Barber and William L. Nikas alleged that Washington County District 
Attorney Robert Winn and other county officials conspired to maliciously 
prosecute Barber and Nikas for bribery, conspiracy, fraud, and conflict of 
interest, in an effort to avoid the political and economic consequences of a 
county construction contract.281  In their § 1985(3) claim, the plaintiffs 
argued that they were conspired against because they were members of a 
group which ―actively and rigorously endorsed and promoted‖ the 
construction project.282  Consistent with the distinction recognized in the 
Eastern District, the court held that shared political support or opposition to 
a political issue cannot define a class of individuals protected by 
§ 1985(3).283 
The Northern District of New York also follows Keating‘s holding that 
animus against a person motivated by their membership in a political party 
can sustain a § 1985(3) claim.  In Citizens Accord, Inc. v. Town of 
Rochester,284 members of Citizens Accord, a not-for-profit group, alleged 
that certain town actions violated their Equal Protection rights.285  The town 
acquiesced to operations at Accord Speedway in violation of noise 
variances, altered procedures concerning testimony at hearings on the topic, 
and changed the monitoring of noise levels to benefit the speedway.286  The 
court voiced doubts about the viability of the Keating holding but 
concluded that, until the case was overturned, Keating was still binding 
authority.287  Applying Keating, the court concluded that membership in 
Citizens Accord was insufficient to sustain a § 1985(3) claim.288  Citizens 
Accord was organized as a not-for-profit corporation to promote local 
―socially responsible land use control.‖289  The court found that it was not a 
 
political party is a protected group satisfying § 1985‘s class-based discrimination 
requirement, the Second Circuit has clearly stated that a plaintiff who claims discrimination 
because he or she stood ‗in political and philosophical opposition to the defendants‘ and 
were ‗outspoken in their criticism of the defendants‘ political and governmental attitudes and 
activities do not constitute a cognizable class under Section 1985.‘‖ (quoting Gleason v. 
McBride, 869 F.2d 688, 695 (2d Cir. 1989))). 
 279. No. 95-CV-1030(FJS), 1997 WL 151999 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1997) aff’d, 131 F.3d 
130 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 280. See id. at *10 (quoting Gleason, 869 F.2d at 695). 
 281. See id. at *1. 
 282. Id. at *10. 
 283. See id.; supra Part II.C.1. 
 284. Citizens Accord, Inc. v. Town of Rochester, No. 98-CV-0715, 2000 WL 504132 
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2000) aff’d, 29 F. App‘x 767 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 285. Id. at *5. 
 286. Id. at *1. 
 287. See id. at *8. 
 288. See id. at *9. 
 289. See id. 
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political organization.290  ―The fact that a group bands together to voice 
opposition to conduct of another does not, in and of itself, place this group 
within a class protected by § 1985(3).‖291 
2.   Approach Two:  Gleason Requires Racial Class-Based Animus 
The second approach taken by district courts to remedy the confusion 
caused by Gleason is to follow the admonitions in the Gleason dicta and 
impose a racial animus requirement.  The Western District of New York 
and the Southern District of New York, like a majority of the federal district 
courts, have articulated racial animus requirements on purely political 
§ 1985(3) conspiracy claims.292 
In 1998, the Western District heard Adamczyk v. City of Buffalo,293 a case 
involving the violation of a plaintiff‘s Fourteenth Amendment and other 
statutory rights for political gain.294  Plaintiff Lawrence Adamczyk accused 
someone in the Buffalo police department of anonymously faxing a police 
report from a drunk driving arrest, which recorded Adamczyk admitting to 
taking AZT for HIV, with a cover letter warning voters of Adamczyk‘s HIV 
status.295  The report was released when Adamczyk was the Campaign 
Manager of Erie County Executive Dennis Gorski‘s reelection campaign.296  
It was clear to the court that the leak was intended to give Gorski‘s 
opponents an advantage in the election.297  However, the court dismissed 
Adamczyk‘s § 1985(3) claims, in part because he failed to demonstrate that 
he was a member of a protected class and that a conspiracy was motivated 
by such membership.298 
In Juncewicz v. Patton299—decided four years later and citing 
Adamczyk—the court held that political affiliation alone does not satisfy the 
animus or protected group membership requirements of a § 1985(3) 
claim.300  In Juncewicz, Annette Juncewicz was appointed to and held a 
 
 290. See id. 
 291. Id. at *8. 
 292. See Lederman v. Giuliani, No. 98 CIV.2024LMM/JCF, 2007 WL 1623103, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2007); Juncewicz v. Patton, No. 01-CV-0519E(SR), 2002 WL 31654957, 
at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2002); supra Part I.C.1. 
 293. See No. 95-CV-1023E(H), 1998 WL 89342 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 1998). 
 294. See id. at *2, *6–7. 
 295. See id. at *1–2. 
Dear Voter, 
We are bombarded with facts and half-truths in the County Executive race.  One 
concrete fact we all must know is that Gorski‘s campaign manager, Larry 
Adamczyk[,] is infected with AIDS and is HIV+.  All voters should know the 
people around Gorski are not normal people and these people will be running 
county affairs with Gorski the next 4 years.  (Adamczyk[‘s] last arrest and 
cellblock sheet are attached for proof). 
Id. at *2. 
 296. See id. 
 297. See id. 
 298. See id. at *6. 
 299. See Juncewicz v. Patton, No. 01-CV-0519E(SR), 2002 WL 31654957 (W.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 8, 2002). 
 300. See id. at *3. 
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competitive civil service position with the county water authority over the 
opposition of the chairman of the county Democratic Party.301  Juncewicz‘s 
position was eliminated from the authority‘s budget a year later.302  
Juncewicz brought a § 1985(3) claim alleging that her position was 
eliminated as retribution against her husband, a Democratic county 
legislator, who supported a faction in the Democratic Party opposed to its 
chairman.303  Citing Adamczyk, the court dismissed the claim because 
political affiliation or association does not fulfill the class membership or 
animus requirements of § 1985(3).304 
In Fulani v. McAuliffe,305 the Southern District also parted with the 
Eastern and Northern Districts‘ application of Gleason, opting for a 
narrower interpretation of invidious class-based animus that excluded 
animus against a political party as a motivation that could support a claim 
under § 1985(3).306  In Fulani, a group of political independents accused 
Democratic officials of conspiring to violate their rights to vote and freely 
associate by trying to keep Ralph Nader‘s name off the ballot in a number 
of states during the 2004 presidential election.307  Despite the opportunity to 
limit the court‘s holding to the shared political belief reasoning—
recognized by the entire circuit308—the court stated that, ―[m]ore 
importantly,‖ political affiliation was not recognized by the Supreme Court 
or the Second Circuit as a class definition protected by § 1985(3).309  Judge 
Preska appears to have interpreted the class-based animus requirement as 
narrowly as the majority of circuit courts.310 
Two years later, another judge in the Southern District of New York did 
not impose a racial animus requirement on a political party–based claim.  In 
Lederman v. Giuliani,311 Robert Lederman was a member of a group of 
street artists who advocated for greater First Amendment rights for street 
artists.312  The defendants, two court officers, knew Lederman for his 
leafleting near the courthouse.313  Lederman brought a § 1985(3) action 
claiming that the two court officers led him out of court on the pretext of 
searching for a weapon or recording device and assaulted him.314  
Lederman claimed that the attack was motivated by his political activity and 
 
 301. See id. at *1. 
 302. See id. 
 303. See id. 
 304. See id. at *3. 
 305. See No. 04 Civ. 6973(LAP), 2005 WL 2276881 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2005). 
 306. See id. at *6. 
 307. Id. at *1. 
 308. See id. at *6 (―Class-based discrimination against these seven Plaintiffs would seem 
to be made rather difficult, if not impossible, as these Plaintiffs themselves refuse to be 
politically classified.‖). 
 309. See id.  
 310. Compare id., with supra Part II.C.1. (recognizing the similarity between Judge 
Preska‘s interpretation of Gleason with the majority of circuit courts‘ interpretations of 
Scott). 
 311. No. 98 Civ.2024LMM/JCF, 2007 WL 1623103 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2007). 
 312. Id. at *1. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at *5. 
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affiliation with the street artists‘ First Amendment group.315  Consistent 
with Second Circuit precedent, the court acknowledged that groups of 
individuals with shared political beliefs or a shared opposition to policy or 
government actions were not protected against injury from conspiracies 
under § 1985(3).316  The court however denied summary judgment because 
it found a question of fact as to whether the artists‘ group was a political 
organization.317 
Most recently, in 2014, however, a judge in the Southern District again 
articulated the narrower interpretation of class-based animus.  In Dolan v. 
Connolly,318 an inmate, Rory Dolan, claimed that he was targeted by 
corrections personnel while incarcerated—both at Fishkill Correctional 
Facility and Cayuga Correctional Facility—because he often gave legal 
advice to inmates and aided them in complaints made to the Department of 
Corrections about facility conditions and staff conduct.319  The court 
dismissed Dolan‘s § 1985(3) claim because he did not argue that his 
treatment was motivated by racial or other class-based animus.320  The 
court limited class-based animus to animus against ―those groups with 
discrete and immutable characteristics such as race, national origin, and 
sex.‖321  In any event, the Southern District has not held that animus 
motivated by political party can constitute the animus required to sustain 
§ 1985(3) claims under Scott. 
3.   Two Districts Have Not Directly Decided the Issue 
The Districts of Connecticut and Vermont do not appear to have 
addressed the racial animus requirement to political party based 
conspiracies.  However, in one recent decision, a judge in the District of 
Connecticut indicated that classes and class-based animus may exist in 
categories other than those defined by race.322  Furthermore, at least two 
 
 315. Id. 
 316. See id. (―[T]hose who are in political and philosophical opposition to [the 
defendants], and who are, in addition, outspoken in their criticism of the [defendants‘] 
political and governmental attitudes and activities‘ do not constitute a cognizable class under 
Section 1985.‖ (quoting Gleason v. McBride, 869 F.2d 688, 695 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
 317. Id.  The Lederman court seemingly distinguished between Keating and Gleason after 
the Second Circuit may have hinted at such a distinction in an unpublished decision. See id.; 
Arteta v. County of Orange, 141 F. App‘x 3, 8 (2d Cir. 2005).  However, it is unlikely that 
the Leaderman court relied on Arteta because Lederman only cites to Gleason and not 
Arteta. See generally Lederman, 2007 WL 1623103. 
 318. No. 13 Civ. 5726(GBD)(GWG), 2014 WL 1876524 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014), report 
and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 3057973 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2014). 
 319. Id. at *1. 
 320. Id. at *12. 
 321. Id. (quoting Vega v. Artus, 610 F. Supp. 2d 185, 204 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)). 
 322. See Orr v. Wisner, No. 3:08-CV-953(JCH), 2010 WL 2667918, at *9 (D. Conn. June 
29, 2010).  After concluding that plaintiffs did not claim a conspiracy motivated by racial 
animus, the court stated that it ―must consider whether there is evidence of a conspiracy 
motivated by animus that is ‗otherwise class-based.‘ . . . [A] federal court must consider 
whether the ‗class‘ at issue in fact constitutes a ‗class,‘ rather than merely a group of 
individuals ‗seeking to engage in the activity the defendant has interfered with.‘‖ Id. 
(quoting Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 991 F.2d 1039, 1046 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
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District of Connecticut cases cited Keating to list political affiliation as one 
of many nonracial classes that fall within the gamut of § 1985(3).323  
Additionally, the District of Connecticut is in agreement with the other 
districts in the circuit in refusing to find classes defined by a shared position 
on an issue to be protected by § 1985(3).324 
III.   THE SECOND CIRCUIT SHOULD RECOGNIZE 
POLITICAL ANIMUS FOR § 1985(3) CONSPIRACIES 
The Second Circuit should resolve the confusion among its district courts 
by adopting the reconciliation of Keating and Gleason articulated by Judge 
Glasser of the Eastern District of New York in Platsky v. Kilpatrick.  Judge 
Glasser interpreted § 1985(3) to address political party animus absent racial 
animus, while excluding classes defined by shared political belief or 
common political activity.325  Part III.A argues that both the history of the 
Reconstruction South and the legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act 
indicate Congress‘s intent to cover politically motivated conspiracies.  Part 
III.B discusses how recognition of political party–motivated conspiracies is 
consistent with Scott and Bray.  Part III.C explains that the Second Circuit 
can reconcile Keating and Gleason by recognizing political party–
motivated animus.  Part III.D applies the proposed rule to the district court 
cases discussed in Part II.C. 
A.   The Racial Animus Requirement Is Inconsistent 
with Legislative and Social History 
The social history of the Reconstruction South and legislative history of 
the Ku Klux Klan Act do not support a racial animus requirement on 
§ 1985(3) claims against political conspiracies.  Both the Ku Klux Klan Act 
and the violence it was intended to address took place in the context of 
economic and political instability in the South.326  The economy was 
devastated and new governments were being formed without the 
participation or recognition of the former political and social elite.327  In a 
society where violence was a common tool to enforce social norms,328 it is 
far too simplistic to view Klan violence as exclusively racially motivated. 
The Klan of the Reconstruction South may be characterized more 
accurately as a counterrevolutionary militant force, attempting to reverse 
Reconstruction and restore the South‘s Antebellum Democratic political 
leadership to power.329  White legal and social supremacy was a component 
 
 323. Nixon v. Blumenthal, No. CIV 3:08CV1933 (JBA), 2010 WL 918091, at *6 n.3 (D. 
Conn. Mar. 11, 2010), aff’d, 409 F. App‘x 391 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Orr, 2010 WL 
2667918, at *9. 
 324. Mahoney v. Nat‘l Org. for Women, 681 F. Supp. 129, 135 (D. Conn. 1987); see 
supra notes 271, 283, 290, 298, 316 and accompanying text. 
 325. See supra notes 269–72 and accompanying text. 
 326. See supra notes 31–35, 40–45 and accompanying text. 
 327. See supra notes 31–35, 40–45 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra note 49. 
 329. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
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of the antebellum South that the Klan was trying to restore.330  But the 
principal goal of the movement was the restoration of Democratic control of 
local politics and the local economy.331  As the statute was enacted to 
combat Klan violence, it is unlikely that Congress would limit its 
applicability to only one aspect of what motivated that violence. 
Indeed, the legislative history of the Act is replete with floor speeches 
and committee reports that indicate that the Republican majority in 
Congress was motivated by more than racial discrimination.  Legislative 
committees were tasked with discovering whether bands of a ―political 
character‖ were waging a campaign of violence.332  A Senate report 
concluded that the Klan carried out its violence—against blacks, Northern 
Republicans and Southern Republicans—with the goal of restoring white 
Democratic rule.333 
Congress filled volumes of the legislative record with floor speeches, 
including excerpts of testimony given in committee, about the scope of 
Klan violence beyond its racial motivations.  Representative William 
Stoughton, one of the primary supporters of the Act in the House, 
expounded on the political motivation to Klan violence by highlighting the 
relationship between Klan membership and the Democratic Party, the 
murders of leading Republicans, and the use of terrorism against blacks to 
ensure Democratic victory at the polls.334  Other legislators in the 
Republican majority echoed this sentiment, and in various ways, expressed 
their understanding that Klan violence was political violence targeting 
Republicans.335  Committee testimony from Klan members stated that 
Democrats invariably supported the Klan, and that the Klan‘s self-described 
purposes were the overthrow of Reconstructionist policies (northern 
Republican control) and the disenfranchisement of blacks.336  Committee 
testimony read during the House floor debates contained accounts of Klan 
members using intimidation to deter blacks from voting Republican, but 
refraining from attacking blacks who they convinced to vote Democratic.337  
It appears evident that, though race was a motivating factor in Klan 
violence against blacks, black suffrage and black free labor were just 
components of the Klan‘s hatred of Republicans.338 
The most defensible conclusion drawn from an examination of the social 
history of the Reconstruction South and the legislative history of the Ku 
Klux Klan Act is that Congress intended to address violence motivated by 
either racial hatred or antagonism against the opposing political party. 
 
 330. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
 332. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 333. See supra notes 50–64 and accompanying text. 
 334. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 335. See supra notes 86–87. 
 336. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
 337. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 338. See supra Part I.A. 
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B.   The Distinction Between Political Parties and Shared Beliefs 
Is Consistent with Scott and Bray 
The Second Circuit can adopt an interpretation of § 1985(3) that defends 
against political affiliation–motivated conspiracies while remaining 
consistent with Scott and Bray.  In Scott, nonunion laborers claimed that 
they were attacked because of opposition to their employer‘s use of 
nonunion construction labor.339  The Court faced two definitions of classes 
potentially protected by § 1985(3):  a class defined by shared economic 
ideology or a class defined by common economic conduct.340  Read 
narrowly, Scott only excludes conspiracies motivated by shared economic 
beliefs or activities.  This is supported by the Court‘s conclusion that 
carpetbaggers were not targeted because of their independent economic 
activities but because they were either Republicans or supporters of 
blacks.341  The Scott Court called into question extending § 1985(3) to 
politically motivated–conspiracies in dicta because of a concern over the 
potential breadth of cases that may ensue.342 
In Bray, the Court confirmed its position that common activities or 
beliefs could not define a § 1985(3) protected class or class-based 
animus.343  The Court rejected the argument of abortion providers and 
women‘s rights groups that § 1985(3) protected women seeking abortions 
or women supporting abortion rights from efforts by pro-life activists to 
block access to abortion services.344  The Court found that permitting class 
definitions based solely on common actions or commonly held beliefs 
would turn § 1985(3) into the general tort statute opposed by the 42nd 
Congress.345 
The Scott decision does not preclude the Second Circuit from affirming 
its Keating holding, which rejected the racial animus requirement for 
asserted political affiliation–based conspiracy claims.  The two cases are 
distinguishable.  Keating claimed his tenure rights as a civil service 
employee were violated because he was a member of the Republican 
Party.346  In Scott, the laborers were targeted because of each individual‘s 
choice to work in the construction trade without joining a union.347  The 
Scott Court‘s refusal to recognize a class based on the common activity of 
unaffiliated individuals is consistent with the Court‘s goal to prevent 
§ 1985(3) from becoming a general torts statute.348  However, Keating was 
 
 339. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 340. See United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 837–38 (1983). 
 341. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.  Given the North‘s reluctance to adopt 
racial social equality and identification of the Democratic Party with secession, a 
carpetbagger would more likely be a Republican than interested in black suffrage. 
 342. See supra note 178. 
 343. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 344. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text. 
 345. See supra notes 158, 189 and accompanying text. 
 346. See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text. 
 347. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 348. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
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a formal member of a political party,349 whose membership is limited and 
defined by the party itself and state election law.350  Recognition of 
conspiracies motivated by membership in a state-defined political party 
may allow application of § 1985(3) that is true to its legislative history 
while precluding claims where the class is self-defined by its members 
based on their shared actions or beliefs. 
The Second Circuit, like it did in Keating, may refuse to require racial 
animus in political affiliation animus cases based on the statute‘s legislative 
history,351 notwithstanding the Scott Court‘s interpretation of that history.  
Unlike the argument in Justice Blackmun‘s dissent, the Scott Court‘s 
discussion of the statute‘s legislative history is limited to Senator 
Edmunds‘s expounding on the scope of the statute352 and Senator Pool‘s 
denial of any economic motivation for Klan violence.353  The Scott Court 
needed to look to the broadest statements of legislative intent because there 
was no mention of the statute protecting collective bargaining rights in the 
legislative history.354  The Court supported its rejection of the sufficiency of 
economic bias absent racial animus to state a § 1985(3) claim with floor 
statements that elevated the Southerners‘ political motivations over their 
animosity toward carpetbaggers, a symbol of Northern economic 
exploitation of the South.355  The federal government would not protect 
collective bargaining rights until the mid-1930s.356  Conversely, the 
legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act is replete with congressmen 
decrying Klan‘s targeting of Republicans for electoral gain.357  The Scott 
Court may have simply dismissed the abundance of references to protecting 
Republicans as immaterial to the question of economic ideological animus. 
Admittedly, the Second Circuit‘s requirement of the presence of racial 
animus in political conspiracies not involving party membership is 
consistent with Scott and Bray.  In Scott, the Court found that laborers who 
individually chose not to join a union could not claim class-based 
discrimination based on their common activity absent some tangible 
affiliation or racial animus.358  In Bray, the Court found that the planned 
obstruction of abortion clinic operations motivated by opposition to 
abortion did not give rise to a § 1985(3) cause of action.359  Similarly in 
Gleason, the Second Circuit found that a political independent could not 
state a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim motivated by opposing a sitting mayor‘s 
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 350. See, e.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 5-300 to -310 (McKinney 2010). 
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reelection.360  Both courts, concerned with the potential for an unlimited 
scope of coverage, left the potential for a bright line regarding animus based 
on political affiliation. 
Formal party affiliation may be the best way to limit the scope of 
§ 1985(3) claim while staying true to the intent of Congress.  Political 
parties are limited, predictable, and legally defined classes of individuals.361  
The Second Circuit‘s rejection of political issue–motivated animus362 
prevents the potential of an infinite number of class-based animus 
definitions based on an indefinite number of potential issues or positions on 
issues. 
The Scott Court‘s concern that applying § 1985(3) to political 
conspiracies absent racial animus would lead to abuses is addressed by the 
Scott decision itself.  The Scott Court claimed that absent the racial animus 
requirement, courts would be open to claims against hecklers at political 
speeches for violating the speaker‘s First Amendment Rights.363  However, 
the Scott Court‘s state action requirement for § 1985(3) claims protecting 
First Amendment rights would preclude the Court‘s hypothetical. 
Additionally, application to cases concerning political patronage 
positions would be precluded by the exclusively remedial nature of the 
statute.  Section 1985(3) does not create rights; it is only a remedy for 
legally protected rights.364  Therefore, § 1985(3) would not apply to at-will 
patronage jobs but only to positions covered by civil service protections. 
C.   Reconciling Keating and Gleason 
The Second Circuit can and should clarify its position on the racial 
animus requirement for politically motivated conspiracies to clear up the 
confusion among its component district courts without overruling Keating 
or Gleason.  Drawing a bright line between conspiracies motivated by the 
target‘s political affiliation and conspiracies motivated by opposition to an 
issue or candidate would fulfill both of these goals. 
This distinction is the principle difference between Keating and Gleason.  
In Keating, Keating was explicitly told that he lost what he believed to be a 
civil service position with tenure rights because of his political party 
position.365  He was denied equal protection of a legally recognized right 
because of his formal membership in a political party.  The Keating 
holding—the plaintiff could state a § 1985(3) claim based on party 
affiliation animus, absent racial animus—would be affirmed by a circuit 
decision clarifying the distinction between party membership and mere 
political opposition. 
Similarly, all but the Gleason dicta on the racial class-based animus 
requirement would be affirmed by a court decision clarifying the distinction 
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between party membership–based claims and political opposition–based 
claims.  In Gleason, the court rejected a political independent‘s claim of 
discrimination motivated by electoral opposition in a previous mayoral 
campaign.366  This result and more recent Second Circuit decisions 
concerning politically motivated conspiracy claims367—absent party 
membership—would be affirmed by drawing this distinction. 
D.   The Impact on District Court Holdings 
Adopting a bright-line rule distinguishing between conspiracies 
motivated by political affiliation–based animus, and those motivated by 
common beliefs or activities will impact how some of the district courts 
within the Second Circuit interpret Scott, Keating, and Gleason.  
Part III.D.1 explains that the proposed bright-line rule would have had little 
impact on the dispositions of the previously discussed cases from the 
Northern and Eastern Districts of New York.  Part III.D.2 describes how the 
proposed bright-line rule would repudiate the Western District of New 
York‘s approach to interpreting the meaning of Gleason and Scott.  
Part III.D.3 discusses how the proposed bright-line rule would resolve the 
potentially conflicting approaches employed by judges in the Southern 
District of New York. 
1.   The Proposed Standard Is Consistent with Holdings 
by the Northern and Eastern Districts of New York 
Little would change in the Northern and Eastern Districts of New York if 
the Second Circuit adopted the reconciliation of Gleason and Keating, 
proposed in Platsky. 
In the Eastern District of New York case Fishman v. County of Nassau, 
Fishman claimed that he lost his county employment solely because of his 
political party.368  Under the proposed reconciliation, because Fishman‘s 
government employer conspired with the Republican Party leadership to 
discriminate against Fishman because of his membership in the Democratic 
Party,369 the claim would remain actionable.  The only difference would be 
that the district court would not have to rely on precedent of doubted 
validity. 
In a hypothetical case similar to Platsky v. Kilpatrick, but where there 
was sufficient linkage between class animus and the defendant‘s actions,370 
a district court applying the proposed distinction may find a § 1985(3) 
claim actionable.  In Platsky, Henry Platsky claimed that he faced 
harassment, intimidation, false arrest, and eviction because he was an 
avowed Socialist who belonged to numerous Socialist organizations.371  If 
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the same case were to arise today under the proposed standard, the district 
court would dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff was enrolled in a 
Connecticut town Socialist Party.372  The plaintiff may be a member of 
groups of self-identifying Socialists, but there would be no party affiliation.  
If the Socialist Party did exist within the Second Circuit and a conspiracy 
was motivated by membership in that party, a claim would be actionable 
under the proposed standard. 
The disposition of neither Northern District of New York case, both 
discussed in Part II.C.1, would change under the proposed bright-line rule.  
In Barber, Robert Barber and William L. Nikas alleged that defendants, the 
Washington County District Attorney and other county officials, conspired 
to maliciously prosecute the plaintiffs on bribery, fraud, and conflict of 
interest charges.373  The plaintiffs further alleged that the conspiracy was 
motivated by their common support for a county-funded construction 
project.374  In Citizens Accord, the plaintiffs were members of a non-profit 
group interested in promoting responsible land use control.375  Under the 
proposed standard, a district court would find neither claim actionable 
because in each case the proposed purely political class was not a political 
party.  The only difference in a future case would be that the district court 
would not have to apply Keating while doubting its continued validity. 
2.   The Proposed Standard Strikes Down 
the Western District of New York‘s Racial Animus Requirement 
The proposed standard that preserves Keating would overturn the 
Western District of New York‘s imposition of a racial animus requirement 
for purely political classes.  In Juncewicz v. Patton, Juncewicz was a civil 
service employee who claimed she lost her job in an act of political 
retribution for her husband‘s failure to support their county party‘s 
chairman.376  Though the Juncewicz court‘s interpretation of § 1985(3) and 
the proposed standard would result in the same disposition, the reasoning 
would be different.  The Western District dismissed the claim because the 
asserted class was defined by political affiliation or association.377  Under 
the proposed standard, because the case appears to be an intraparty 
squabble, where personal opposition motivated any conspiracy, the fact 
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pattern lacks animus based on party enrollment.  The case would fall under 
the second prong, requiring racial animus in political cases based on 
opposition to a candidate, issue, or common activity. 
3.   The Proposed Standard Resolves the Inconsistency 
in Southern District of New York Holdings 
Under existing Second Circuit jurisprudence, the Southern District of 
New York consistently denies purely political § 1985(3) claims that are not 
based on political affiliation.378  However, the court has produced 
inconsistent results with regards to political affiliation based § 1985(3) 
claims.379  In Fulani, the court heard a discrimination claim made by 
political independents alleging an infringement of rights motivated by the 
plaintiff‘s support for Ralph Nader over John Kerry.  The court dismissed 
the case, articulating a rejection of all purely political class–based animus 
claims, including classes defined on the basis of political party 
affiliation.380  Two years later, the court, in Lederman, signaled a 
willingness to apply Keating when it denied summary judgment despite 
Lederman‘s claims based either on disfavored political behavior or 
affiliation with a First Amendment advocacy group.381 
Adoption of the proposed standard would not change how the Southern 
District of New York decides purely political § 1985(3) claims based on 
shared political ideology or political beliefs.  Absent formal party 
affiliation, those claims would be dismissed.  Under the proposed bright-
line rule, the Fulani case would result in the same disposition:  dismissal of 
the § 1985(3) claim.  However, under the proposed bright-line rule, the 
§ 1985(3) claim of political independents alleging a conspiracy motivated 
by opposition in an election absent racial animus would be dismissed for 
failure to allege political party animus. 
Finally, adoption of the proposed bright-line rule may narrow 
circumstances where § 1985(3) claims may be made for purely political 
conspiracies.  Unlike Lederman, which entertained the possibility of a First 
Amendment advocacy group being protected as a political party, under the 
proposed standard, the statute would only apply to conspiracies motivated 
by membership in an officially recognized political party.  Treating every 
advocacy group like a political party would allow any group of people 
defined by a shared position on an issue or opposition to a candidate to fall 
under the statute by virtue of incorporating under state law.  This would 
defeat the limit the Gleason court intended to impose. 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of recent accusations of political bias at the IRS,382 it may be an 
appropriate time to reassess the potential for existing statutes to remedy 
party affiliation–motivated discrimination.  Though not a perfect fit, 
rejecting a racial animus requirement on purely political conspiracy claims 
motivated by political party animus but imposing the requirement for all 
other political conspiracies may preserve § 1985(3) as a remedy for Tea 
Party groups combating the IRS‘s alleged discrimination.  The ability of 
Tea Party groups to take advantage of § 1985(3) under this standard would 
depend on whether the court believes the Tea Party organizations are 
independent advocacy organizations, unprotected by the standard proposed 
in Part III, or an organ of the Republican Party as some pundits have 
suggested.383 
The Tea Party aside, the existing § 1985(3) jurisprudence created an 
inconsistency in the application of the statute.384  This Note suggests a 
solution the Second Circuit may adopt to resolve the inconsistencies in the 
application of § 1985(3) among its district courts, absent clarification from 
the Supreme Court.  However, only the Supreme Court can reach an 
ultimate resolution of the question of a racial animus requirement for purely 
political conspiracies.  It would require a Supreme Court decision on the 
issue to resolve the nationwide circuit split. 
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